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The production of natural gas from formerly inaccessible shale formations 
through the use of hydraulic fracturing has expanded domestic energy supplies and 
lowered prices and is stimulating the replacement of dirtier fossil fuels with cleaner 
natural gas. At the same time, shale gas production has proven controversial, 
triggering intense opposition in some parts of the United States. State and local 
regulators have scrambled to adapt to the boom in natural gas production, raising 
the question of whether federal regulators should step in to supplant or supplement 
state regulation. This Article takes a policy-neutral approach to the federalism 
questions at the center of that inquiry, asking which level of government ought to 
resolve these policy questions, rather than which level of government is likely to 
produce a particular favored policy outcome. Consequently, this analysis begins with 
four economic and political rationales typically used to justify federal regulation. 
Federal regulation is necessary (1) to address spillover effects that cross state 
boundaries, (2) to prevent economic forces at the state level from initiating a “race 
to the bottom” in environmental regulation, (3) to promote business efficiencies 
through uniform national standards, and (4) to respond to national interests in the 
development of natural resources through a federal licensing system. Applying these 
rationales to the regulation of fracking yields several important conclusions. First, 
while a few of the externalities of shale gas production cross state boundaries, most 
are experienced locally. Second, existing federal regulatory regimes offer ample 
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authority to address those few interstate externalities. Third, the race-to-the-bottom 
rationale does not justify federal regulation of shale gas production because shale gas 
states are not competing for quantity- or time-limited capital investment. Fourth, 
given that the impacts of fracking are still under study and the subject of 
considerable ongoing debate, there is currently no overriding national interest 
supporting the creation of a comprehensive federal licensing or regulatory regime for 
shale gas production. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American energy policy landscape is undergoing a revolution.1 The 
production of natural gas from formerly inaccessible shale formations 
through the use of hydraulic fracturing2 (also known as “fracking”) has 
transformed American energy options. Only a few years ago, American 
policymakers foresaw a future increasingly dependent upon natural gas 
imports;3 they now foresee that domestic production will be sufficient to 
serve the country’s needs for as many as 100 years.4 That ample supply, in 
turn, has tamed natural gas markets. Natural gas prices have always been 
volatile (and frequently high), but forecasters now predict low prices into 
the foreseeable future.5 Low natural gas prices could stimulate the replace-
ment of dirtier fossil fuels (coal and oil) with cleaner natural gas (in elec-
tricity generation and transportation, respectively), hastening the long-held 
dream of the industry’s proponents that natural gas would serve as a bridge 
fuel to a renewable energy future.6 According to the International Energy 
 
1 Bloomberg reported recently that “[t]he U.S. is the closest it has been in almost 20 years to 
achieving energy self-sufficiency” and that it could become the world’s top energy producer in less 
than ten years. Rich Miller et al., Americans Gaining Energy Independence with U.S. as Top Producer, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-07/americans-gaining-energy-
independence-with-u-s-as-top-producer.html. 
2 For a description of this production technique, see infra Section I.A. 
3 See Howard Rogers, Shale Gas—The Unfolding Story, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 117, 
118 (2011) (“In North America, in 2001 domestic production began a pronounced decline and large-
scale liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports appeared inevitable by 2010.”). 
4 The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) most recent estimate of the United 
States’ unproved technically recoverable shale gas reserves is 482 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), which 
represents a significant increase in total reserves. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2012: EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 9 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ 
aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2012).pdf; see also infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
5 One way to predict natural gas prices is to look at “forward curves” produced by the New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). These curves are based upon prices of futures contracts—
contracts for the sale of natural gas at various points in the future. For a fuller explanation of 
natural gas forward curves, see Mark Bolinger et al., Accounting for Fuel Price Risk: Using Forward 
Natural Gas Prices Instead of Gas Price Forecasts to Compare Renewable to Natural Gas-Fired Genera-
tion, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 706 (2006). 
As of September 2012, the NYMEX forward curve for natural gas projects that prices will 
remain at or below five dollars per million British thermal units (MMBtu) over the next five 
years. Gas Futures Trading: Forward Price Curve, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/mkt-gas/trading/ngas-tr-fwd-pr.pdf (last updated Sept. 4, 2012). This compares with 
natural gas spot prices that varied between $1.74 and $18.48 per MMBtu in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. See Henry Hub Gulf Coast Natural Gas Spot Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdd.htm (last updated Oct. 1, 2012). A British thermal 
unit is roughly the amount of energy required to raise the temperature of one pound of water one 
degree, from thirty-nine to forty degrees Fahrenheit. 
6 See Roberto F. Aguilera & Roberto Aguilera, World Natural Gas Endowment as a Bridge 
Towards Zero Carbon Emissions, 79 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 579, 579 
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Agency (IEA), emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States fell in 
2011, in large part because of shifts from coal-fired electric generation to 
gas-fired generation—a change that the IEA attributed to increased shale 
gas production.7  
At the same time, however, shale gas production has proven very contro-
versial. The rapid increase in this type of production has been driven in 
large part by production techniques (horizontal drilling and fracking) that 
are now in use on a much wider scale than ever before.8 Use of these 
techniques produces negative externalities9—pollution and other byproducts 
borne mostly by the community in which shale gas production occurs—
which have generated intense opposition to shale gas production in some 
parts of the United States and the world.10  
State and federal regulators have scrambled to adapt to the boom in  
natural gas production and the controversy it has spawned.11 That scramble 
has produced a significant amount of regulatory change in states from Texas 
to New York.12 Some states have reacted cautiously, banning shale gas 
production pending further study of its risks.13 Others have opened their 
shale gas formations (“shale plays” in the industry vernacular) to development 
 
(2012) (“As the world economy continues to expand over the long term, natural gas has the 
potential to play a significant role in satisfying energy demand and acting as a bridge towards 
renewables.”); Joe Nocera, How to Frack Responsibly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, at A25 (noting 
Environmental Defense Fund President Fred Krupp’s support for the notion of natural gas as a 
bridge fuel). 
7 See Guy Chazan, Shale Gas Boom Helps Slash US Emissions, FIN. TIMES (May 23, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3aa19200-a4eb-11e1-b421-00144feabdc0.html (quoting IEA chief 
economist Fatih Birol supporting this conclusion). Indeed, in April 2012, coal-fired power’s share 
of American electricity generation fell to virtually equal to that of natural gas for the first time. See 
Monthly Coal- and Natural Gas-Fired Generation Equal for First Time in April 2012, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (July 6, 2012), (July 6, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm 
?id=6990.  
8 OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER, at ES-1 (2009) [hereinafter OFE, SHALE GAS 
PRIMER], available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/epreports/shale_ 
gas_primer_2009.pdf. 
9 The term “externality” refers to costs of production that are not borne by the firm, but 
rather are shifted to society. Externalities can be either negative or positive. For a discussion of 
the economics of negative externalities, see TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 51-54 (3d ed. 1992). For a discussion of the externalities of 
shale gas production, see infra Section I.B. 
10 For a discussion of public attitudes toward shale gas production, see infra Section I.B. 
11 Hannah Wiseman has referred to this process as “regulatory adaptation.” See Hannah 
Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 252-82 (2010) 
(arguing that while states have adapted with some success in the face of tremendous information 
asymmetries, there remain regulatory gaps to be filled). 
12 See infra Section II.B. 
13 See, e.g., infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text (describing the ban on fracking in New York). 
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under existing state regulatory regimes, adjusting those regimes to address 
new or newly recognized risks.14 While the process of state regulatory 
adjustment continues, it has not quieted opponents of shale gas produc-
tion.15 At the national level, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
engaged in a multi-year study of the industry, which may yield additional 
federal regulation.16  
These observations raise important questions: What, if anything, should 
the federal government do about fracking? Should Congress pass compre-
hensive federal licensing rules or standards governing the industry? Should 
the EPA use existing regulatory authority to impose further restrictions on 
fracking or to fill gaps in state regulatory regimes? Or is the regulation of 
this industry better left to the states, whose varied regulatory approaches 
represent a series of experiments from which all can learn? These questions 
are located at the intersection of federalism and regulation. Specifically, 
Congress, the EPA, and state and local government actors may all have 
preferences regarding fracking policy, which raises the question of which 
level of government is the most appropriate regulator. This Article will 
address these questions by exploring the commonly employed theoretical 
rationales for regulating at the federal level, and applying those rationales to 
the risks associated with fracking and shale gas production. The analysis 
shows that a comprehensive federal licensing or regulatory regime for shale 
gas production is probably unnecessary—and, at least premature—but that 
the federal government might appropriately regulate specific aspects of 
shale gas production that implicate national or global interests. 
Part I of this Article examines the process of fracking, including the 
technological advances that have made it cheaper to produce natural gas 
from shale, and the effect of fracking production in three states containing 
large shale gas plays—Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York. Part I also 
explores the external effects of shale production on air, water, groundwater, 
community character, and other public goods, and further notes the ongoing 
debate over their significance and magnitude.  
Part II examines fracking’s existing regulatory environment. It describes 
the major federal regimes that regulate fracking operations and notes that 
Congress has exempted the fracking process from some of those regimes. It 
then compares the state regulatory regimes governing fracking in Texas, 
 
14 See infra Section II.B. 
15 See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
16 The EPA has outlined the goals and design of the study in OFFICE OF RESEARCH & 
DEV., EPA, EPA/600/R-11/1212, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 1-8, 20-22 (2011), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/hfstudy/HF_Study__Plan_110211_FINAL_508.pdf. 
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Pennsylvania, and New York. The analysis notes differences in these states’ 
regulatory strategies, including their coverage, stringency, and use of either 
detailed prescriptions or general performance standards. It is evident from 
this snapshot of state regulation that state rules have lagged behind the 
development of the industry. Part II also examines the effects of regulatory 
agency structure on a state’s regulatory approach. Specifically, it explores 
the implications of assigning primary regulatory jurisdiction to an oil and 
gas commission (as in Texas), or to a state environmental agency (as in 
Pennsylvania and New York). While it is difficult to reach general conclu-
sions in response to this question, it appears that the Texas regulations 
governing technical issues (such as construction) are more specific than 
those promulgated by the New York and Pennsylvania environmental 
agencies. Conversely, the New York and Pennsylvania agencies seem to 
focus more of their attention on environmental protection than does the 
Texas commission.  
Part III addresses the federalism questions at the heart of the regulation 
of energy facilities. The federal government clearly has the power to 
regulate fracking under the Commerce Clause because of the industry’s 
substantial effects on interstate commerce.17 That observation, however, 
does not answer the question of where regulatory authority ought to lie. The 
analysis approaches this normative question in policy-neutral terms, placing 
the question of who ought to regulate prior to questions about what the 
regulation should be. This approach reveals four rationales that we typically 
use to justify federal regulation. Federal regulation is necessary (1) to 
address spillover effects that cross state boundaries; (2) to prevent economic 
forces at the state-level from initiating a “race to the bottom”18 in environ-
mental regulation; (3) to promote business efficiencies through uniform 
national standards; and (4) to respond to national interests in the develop-
ment of natural resources through a federal licensing system.19 Part III also 
 
17 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-68 (1995) (holding that an activity can be 
regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause if it “substantially affects” interstate 
commerce); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (requiring activities that 
are regulated under the Commerce Clause to be “some sort of economic endeavor”). The Lopez 
and Morrison decisions involved federal attempts to regulate activities that were essentially not 
economic in nature. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02 (reviewing the constitutionality of federal 
civil remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (reviewing the 
constitutionality of a federal criminal offense for possession of firearms within a school area). 
Natural gas production, by contrast, is clearly an economic activity closely connected to interstate 
commerce, since natural gas markets cross state lines. 
18 For a thorough description of the race-to-the-bottom argument, see infra subsection III.A.1. 
19 Some scholars offer broader rationales for federal environmental regulation that focus on 
protecting moral rights or giving effect to the preferences of out-of-state actors even when the 
  
2013] Political Economy of Energy Production 437 
 
explores how existing energy regulatory regimes are justified using one or 
more of these grounds.  
Part IV applies the various rationales for federal regulation developed in 
Part III to the production of shale gas using fracking. It concludes that 
while some of the impacts of fracking cross state boundaries, most are local. 
Existing federal regulations offer ample authority to address those impacts 
that have national scope, and federal regulators are already using that 
authority to regulate shale gas production. The analysis does not support 
the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal shale gas regulation because 
there is sufficient capital to develop shale gas wherever it is found. Nor does 
there appear to be a need for a comprehensive federal licensing regime, as 
shale gas development is proceeding apace without any such regime. The 
final Section discusses some of the implications of this analysis for future 
regulation of fracking and shale gas production, and recommends that the 
EPA limit new regulation of fracking to those elements of the process that 
pose national or global risks. 
I. SHALE GAS PRODUCTION AND FRACKING 
Over the last several years, there has been increasing controversy over 
the production of natural gas from shale deposits using fracking, most of 
which surrounds the environmental, health, and safety risks associated with 
the techniques employed. Indeed, opposition to fracking has led to perma-
nent or temporary bans in France, South Africa, Vermont, New York, and 
various other communities throughout the world.20 These bans and moratoria 
reflect the intensity with which some local communities, or subsections of 
those communities, have opposed fracturing operations on environmental, 
health, and safety grounds.21 
 
costs and benefits of the potentially regulated activity fall entirely within the state. For a 
discussion of these arguments, see infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
20 See Andrew Chow, Vermont Bans Fracking, Citing Injury Concerns, FINDLAW (May 23, 2012, 
8:43 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2012/05/vermont-bans-fracking-citing-injury-concerns.html; 
Tara Patel, France to Keep Fracking Ban to Protect Environment, Sarkozy Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct.  
4, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-04/france-to-press-ahead-with-shale-research-after-
fracking-ban.html; see also Steve Hargreaves, The Fracking Public Relations Mess, CNNMONEY 
(June 21, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/21/news/economy/fracking_public_relations/index. 
htm (discussing fracking bans in Maryland, Quebec, Germany, South Africa, and elsewhere). For 
a fuller explanation of the New York ban, see infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
21 See Mireya Navarro, Judge’s Ruling Complicates Gas Drilling Issue in New York, N.Y.  
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at A23 (discussing litigation in New York regarding state restrictions on  
fracking); John Kemp, Making Fracking Politically Acceptable, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/column-fracking-politics-idUSL5E8D62Q920120206 
(“Hydraulic fracturing has already unleashed a storm of threatening protest threatening the 
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A. Fracking, Generally 
Conventional natural gas production involves the drilling of wells into 
permeable or semipermeable formations in which natural gas (methane) is 
moved to the surface through a well. Conventional natural gas may be 
found dissolved in oil and as a cap on top of underground oil formations 
(so-called “associated gas,” because it is associated with oil production); 
alternatively, it may be found between rock formations in the absence of oil 
(“unassociated gas”).22 Geologists have long known that a significant amount 
of natural gas is trapped in nonpermeable rock formations below the Earth’s 
surface, including shale formations found at great depths (usually 4000-
10,000 feet).23 In the last decade or so, oil and gas production and service 
companies have perfected the use of fracking, an old technique, to produce 
natural gas from shale formations in a cost-competitive way.  
Fracking involves the injection of fluids deep into the ground at high 
pressure to fracture rock, thereby creating openings that allow gas to flow 
into production wells.24 A portion of these fracturing fluids returns to the 
surface as “flowback water”; by contrast, produced water is water that was 
already underground and that can float to the surface through the well 
before or after hydraulic fracturing.25 The well is ready to produce natural 
gas once flowback water ceases flowing from the well. Advances in drilling 
technology, particularly horizontal drilling, and the development of more 
effective “fracking fluids” have significantly reduced the costs of producing 
natural gas through fracking, because horizontal drilling technologies permit 
producers to access more gas from fewer drilling sites. Using these technolo-
gies, producers first drill down to the shale layer and subsequently drill 
horizontally. Through this approach, multiple wells can be drilled from a 
single drilling pad, and each well can be separately “fracked” by injecting 
 
technology’s viability.”); Jim Polson, New Yorkers Split on Marcellus Shale Gas Drilling, Survey Finds, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-21/new-yorkers-split-on-
marcellus-shale-gas-drilling-survey-finds.html (describing results of a survey that indicates 
comparatively higher opposition to drilling among upstate New York residents who have both 
more to gain and more to lose from fracking operations).  
22 MARTIN KRAMER, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 64, 676 (10th ed. 1997). 
23 Some shale gas formations are even deeper. For an in-depth description of the major shale 
gas formations in the United States, including data on their respective depths, see OFE, SHALE 
GAS PRIMER, supra note 8, at 17. 
24 For an uncomplicated video intelligibly explaining how fracking works, see MarathonOil-
Corp, Animation of Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2012) [hereinafter 
Animation of Hydraulic Fracturing], http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VY34PQUiwOQ. 
25 Eric Schramm, What Is Flow Back, and How Does it Differ from Produced Water?, INST. FOR 
ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH FOR NORTHEASTERN PA. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://energy.wilkes. 
edu/pages/205.asp. 
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fracking fluids to fracture rock, thus enabling natural gas to flow to the 
surface.26 Advances in fracking and horizontal drilling technology have 
stimulated a kind of “natural gas rush” into shale gas formations.27 Notably, 
fracking was first used widely in Texas’s Barnett Shale28 and Louisiana’s 
Haynesville Shale, 29  but quickly spread to other areas, including the 
Marcellus Shale30 in the northeastern United States.  
In 2011, Americans consumed approximately 24 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) 
of gas.31 American shale deposits hold a minimum of several hundred Tcf of 
gas.32 One of the consequences of the relatively sudden availability of this 
multitude of gas is that American natural gas prices have fallen below three 
dollars per MMBtu,33 as compared with prices exceeding ten dollars per 
MMBtu in Asia.34  
 
26 Id.; see also Animation of Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 24. 
27 See OFE, SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 8, at 9-10 (attributing the growth in fracking to 
technological innovations that made the process “economically viable”). 
28 The Barnett Shale holds an estimated 84 Tcf of technically recoverable reserves. Press 
Release, U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Releases New Assessment of Gas Resources in the 
Marcellus Shale, Appalachian Basin (Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/ 
article.asp?ID=2893. 
29 The Haynesville Shale is a shale gas formation located in northern Louisiana and eastern 
Texas. It is estimated to contain approximately 75 Tcf of recoverable reserves. See Review of 
Emerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Shale Oil Plays, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 8, 2011), 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/usshalegas. 
30 The Marcellus Shale holds an estimated 43 Tcf of technically recoverable reserves. JAMES 
L. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ASSESSMENT 
OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS RESOURCES OF THE DEVONIAN MARCELLUS SHALE OF THE 
APPALACHIAN BASIN PROVINCE, 2011 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3092. 
31 U.S. Total Natural Gas Consumption, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
dnav/ng/hist/n9140us2m.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2012).  
32 Estimates of technically recoverable amounts of gas are frequently revised by the EIA and 
the U.S. Geological Survey, two of the more widely followed sources of data on this topic. The 
EIA most recent estimate of technically recoverable reserves is approximately 2200 Tcf.  Frequently 
Asked Questions: How Much Natural Gas Does the United States Have and How Long Will It Last?, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=58&t=8 (last updated 
Aug. 29, 2012). This is a considerable increase from previous estimates, which fluctuated between 
approximately 350 and 850 Tcf. Technically Recoverable Shale Gas Resources Jump 134 Percent, INST. 
FOR ENERGY RES. (May 16, 2011), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/05/16/technically- 
recoverable-shale-gas-resources-jump-134-percent. 
33 U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ 
ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2012). The EIA data are expressed in dollars per 
thousand cubic feet (mcf). One thousand cubic feet of natural gas contains approximately one 
million btu. 
34 E.g., Platts: November Asia LNG Prices Climb, LNG WORLD NEWS (Oct. 18, 2012), http:// 
www.lngworldnews.com/platts-asia-lng-november-spot-prices-rise ($13.005 per MMBtu). 
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B. Environmental Impacts 
The environmental impacts of fracking are disputed. Proponents of hy-
draulic fracturing, and of natural gas production more generally, sometimes 
claim that, despite fracking hundreds of thousands (or millions) of wells in 
the United States, fracking has not produced a single confirmed case of 
groundwater contamination.35 Opponents of fracking, however, dispute that 
claim by pointing to several cases of alleged contamination of drinking 
water by methane or fracking fluid chemicals.36 Disputes over the source of 
contamination in those cases have triggered a spate of new studies from 
governmental and academic sources.37 Proponents of fracking also tout the 
relatively low air emissions from natural gas combustion, as compared with 
coal or oil. As Table 1 below indicates, on a per-Btu basis, natural gas combus-
tion produces significantly fewer greenhouse gas emissions than either coal or 
oil. Moreover, natural gas combustion produces an even smaller fraction of 
the emissions of the other major pollutants associated with fossil fuel com-
bustion. As a well-established and reliable fuel source for electric genera-
tion, inexpensive and plentiful natural gas could lead to the widespread 
substitution of natural gas–fired electric generation plants for coal-fired 
plants. Additionally, as coal combustion is associated with tens of thousands 
of premature deaths each year, 38  the substitution of natural gas–fired 
electric generation plants for coal-fired plants could yield substantial health 
benefits. 39  Taken together, these considerations underscore why some 
 
35 See, e.g., James Inhofe, Federal Interference in Energy Development Regulation a Bad Idea, 
HILL (July 19, 2011), http://thehill.com/special-reports/energy-july-2011/172393-federal-interference-
in-regulation-of-energy-development-a-bad-idea (“Since the first use of hydraulic fracking . . . 
producers have completed more than 1.5 million fracturing jobs without one confirmed case of 
groundwater contamination . . . .”); Hydraulic Fracking Overview, EMPIRE ENERGY F. (Jan. 10, 
2011), http://www.empireenergyforum.com/article/hydraulic-fracturing-overview (responding to 
New York citizens’ concerns about hydraulic fracturing and asserting that no U.S. government 
study has found evidence that fracking leads to water contamination).  
36 See, e.g., Sean Savett, Inhofe Is Wrong: Five Famous Times Fracking Contaminated Our Water, 
THINKPROGRESS (July 21, 2011, 10:04 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/07/21/274064/ 
inhofe-is-wrong-five-famous-times-fracking-contaminated-our-water. 
37 For a discussion of these studies, see infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. 
38 See Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANN. N.Y. 
ACAD. OF SCI., Feb. 2011, at 73, 82-83 (assessing the negative externalities associated with coal 
production, including premature deaths). For a summary of other studies estimating the external 
costs of coal, see External Costs of Coal, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php? 
title=External_costs_of_coal (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).  
39 On the other hand, natural gas (methane) is itself a potent greenhouse gas. To the extent 
that natural gas production generates increases in fugitive emissions of natural gas from produc-
tion facilities and pipelines, a move from coal- to natural gas–fired generation might not yield 
much in the way of greenhouse gas emissions benefits. See, e.g., Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Greater 
Focus Needed on Methane Leakage from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
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energy planners see natural gas as a “bridge fuel” in the process of moving 
from a fossil fuel economy to one fueled by renewable energy resources.40 
  
Table 1: Fossil Fuel Emission Levels  
(Pounds per Billion Btu of Energy Consumed)41 
 
Pollutant Natural Gas Oil Coal 
Carbon Dioxide 117,000 164,000 208,000 
Carbon Monoxide 40 33 208 
Nitrogen Oxide 92 448 457 
Sulfur Dioxide 1 1122 2591 
Particulates 7 84 2744 
Hydrocarbons <0.001 0.007 0.016 
 
The use of fracking to produce natural gas, however, does have a variety 
of important environmental impacts.42 First, it uses enormous quantities of 
water. The typical fracking operation uses two to four million gallons of 
water.43 Depending upon the particular characteristics of the formation in 
which the fracturing operation occurs, less than 30% to more than 70% of 
that water returns to the surface as flowback water.44 That means that a 
 
6435, 6438 (2012) (concluding that reductions in methane leakage are needed to maximize the 
environmental benefits of natural gas). 
40 JOHN D. PODESTA & TIMOTHY WIRTH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NATURAL GAS: A 
BRIDGE FUEL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/2009/08/pdf/naturalgasmemo.pdf; Joel Kirkland, Natural Gas Could Serve as “Bridge Fuel” to 
a Low-Carbon Future, SCI. AM. (June 25, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id= 
natural-gas-could-serve-as-bridge-fuel-to-low-carbon-future (discussing the efforts of environmental 
advocates to promote the use of natural gas as a short-term option for cutting emissions caused by 
coal-fired power plants). 
41 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0560(98), NATURAL 
GAS 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS 53 fig.22 (1999), available at http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/ 
natural_gas/analysis_publications/natural_gas_1998_issues_trends/pdf/it98.pdf. 
42 For a more thorough description of the environmental consequences of fracking and some 
state efforts to regulate those consequences, see Wiseman, supra note 11, at 253-75. 
43 OFE, SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 8, at 64. The New York State Department of  
Environmental Conservation estimates that a typical fracking job would require “2.4 million to 7.8 
million gallons of water.” N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV’N, REVISED DRAFT SUP-
PLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND 
SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM at 5-93 to -94 (2011), available at http://www.dec. 
ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf. 
44 OFE, SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 8, at 66. Flowback water contains constituents that 
were originally in the fracturing fluids, as well as dirt, silt, and other elements or contaminants 
added to the water during its time underground. 
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typical fracking operation may leave millions of gallons of water deep below 
the earth’s surface. In arid areas, such as the Eagle Ford Shale in southern 
Texas, fracking may strain existing water supplies.45  
Second, fracking fluid mixtures contain toxic chemicals. These mixtures 
are carefully designed to fracture rock in predictable and efficient ways and 
to preserve open spaces so that gas can flow into production wells. Fracking 
fluid mixtures are more than 99% water and sand. Sand is a “proppant,” 
which props open spaces in the rock after the water pressure is reduced and 
the water flows away from the fractures.46 The remainder of the mixture 
consists of various chemicals deemed best for fracturing each particular 
formation. Some fracking fluid constituents are toxic,47 and some mixtures 
contain known carcinogens.48 Industry groups argue that the same constitu-
ents are commonly found in many other household products.49 Neverthe-
less, because some of the fracking fluids that are injected into the ground 
remain there, some of the toxic chemicals in those fluids remain under-
ground as well. The oil and gas industry is developing fracking fluid 
mixtures that contain nontoxic or less toxic constituents, but it does not 
appear that these alternatives are widely used at this point.50 
 
45 There is considerable disagreement about the degree to which fracking exacerbates water 
supply problems. The Railroad Commission of Texas established a task force to study water 
supply issues in the Eagle Ford Shale, which concluded in January 2012 that fracking did not 
threaten local water supplies. Press Release, R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Eagle Ford Task Force Finds 
South Texas Water Supply Sufficient (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/ 
commissioners/porter/press/012612.php. But cf. Rick Spruill, Water Availability, Not Contamination, 
Worries Residents Above Eagle Ford Shale, CALLER.COM (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.caller.com/ 
news/2011/oct/15/water-availability-not-contamination-worries (reporting on local water shortages 
that occurred soon after fracking operations began in Karnes County, Texas); Water Worries 
Shadow Eagle Ford Development, AM. WATER INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 2011), available at http://www. 
americanwaterintel.com/archive/2/1/general/water-worries-shadow-eagle-ford-development.html 
(describing experts’ uncertainty about the impact of fracking on the water supply in the Eagle 
Ford region).  
46 The components of fracturing fluids have become generally known over the last few years, 
in part because of efforts by regulatory agencies to compel disclosure, and in part because of 
voluntary disclosure efforts by natural gas producers and their contractors. For an introduction to 
the composition of fracturing fluid, see OFE, SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 8, at 61-64. 
47 For a thorough discussion of the toxicity of the constituents of fracturing fluids used in 
New York State, see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV’N, supra note 43, at 5-63 to -79. 
48 Id. at 5-76 to -77, 5-79. 
49 See, e.g., Ken Cohen, “Fracking” Fluid Disclosure: Why It’s Important, EXXONMOBIL PERSPS. 
(Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.exxonmobilperspectives.com/2011/08/25/fracking-fluid-disclosure-why-its-
important (identifying several common household products containing the same chemicals found 
in fracturing fluid mixtures). 
50 See New EPA-Aproved [sic] Fracking Fluid 100% Green, BUSINESS WIRE (Jan. 10, 2012, 
11:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120110005568/en/EPA-Aproved-Fracking-
Fluid-100-Green (discussing a new eco-friendly biocide recently approved by the EPA and the 
FDA that will not “harm ground water, area land or jeopardize the health of workers during the 
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Third, fracking produces significant quantities of wastewater. Flowback 
water and produced water contain not only the original fracking fluid 
constituents, but also may contain contaminants introduced into the water 
during its time underground. These contaminants may include salts and 
naturally occurring toxic elements, such as arsenic, and some elements may 
be radioactive.51 The disposal options for this wastewater depend upon the 
nature of the contaminants in the wastewater, the physically available 
disposal options in the vicinity of the operation, and the state and local legal 
regime. The disposal options include direct disposal into surface waters 
through a point source, injection into an underground formation, processing 
in a wastewater treatment facility, and recycling (i.e., reuse in other frack-
ing operations).52 Each of these disposal options poses different challenges. 
In some parts of the country, underground injection is neither easy nor 
available. Depending upon the characteristics of the produced water, it may 
be difficult or impossible to obtain the required permission under the Clean 
Water Act to discharge the wastewater directly into surface waters. 53 
Similarly, some wastewater may contain radioactive elements or other 
contaminants that interfere with the operation of sewage treatment facili-
ties, rendering discharge to such facilities impossible. 54  Finally, many 
 
fracking process”); see also Emran Hussain, Baker Hughes Launches Green Fracking Fluid Systems, 
ARABIANOILANDGAS.COM (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.arabianoilandgas.com/article-8157-baker-
hughes-launches-green-fracking-fluid-systems (reporting the launch of environmentally friendly 
fracking fluids and additives). Some natural gas producers have begun to advocate “propane 
fracking”—a technique for fracturing rock that uses liquid propane instead of conventional 
fracking fluids. E.g., Safe and Efficient, GASFRAC ENERGY SERVICES, http://www.gasfrac.com/ 
safer-energy-solutions. html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); see also Anthony Brino, Waterless Fracking 
Technique Makes Its Debut in Ohio, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (May 15, 2012), http://www. 
midwestenergynews.com/2012/05/15/waterless-fracking-technique-makes-its-debut-in-ohio (describing 
the early experimental stage of fracking with liquid propane gas in the Utica Shale).  
51 See William J. Kemble, Kingston Won’t Accept Fracking Fluids at Sewage Treatment Plant, 
DAILY FREEMAN (Kingston, N.Y.) (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/articles/2011/12/ 
19/news/doc4eee73521641a869886272.txt (citing concerns by local officials that prompted them to 
decline treating wastewater from fracturing operations at a local sewage treatment plant). 
Wastewater can become radioactive because of radioactive elements that enter the water deep 
underground. For a description of these so-called “naturally-occurring radioactive materials” 
(NORM), see Oil and Gas Production Wastes, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/tenorm/ 
oilandgas.html (last updated Aug. 30, 2012). 
52 See The Hydraulic Fracturing Water Cycle, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/hfwatercycle. 
html (last updated Oct. 19, 2012) (summarizing wastewater disposal options). 
53 This method of discharge would require obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permit under the Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006) 
(providing that the Administrator of the EPA may issue a permit for discharge after holding a 
public hearing, as long as certain other statutory conditions are met). 
54 Sewage treatment facilities maintain their own NPDES permit system under the Clean 
Water Act. However, the Clean Water Act imposes “pretreatment” standards on parties that 
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believe that underground injection of wastewater from fracking operations 
in certain locations can trigger seismic events.55 For all of these reasons, 
increasing quantities of flowback water and produced water are treated on 
site and reused in future fracturing operations.56  
Fourth, fracturing operations involve large amounts of construction ac-
tivity and truck traffic. Each operation involves the construction of a 
concrete drilling pad, on which the fracking operations take place. The 
construction of storage facilities required for water and chemicals used in 
fracking fluids changes the landscape. Trucks containing water, chemicals, 
and equipment move to and from multiple fracking operations. These 
activities produce air emissions and noise, sometimes for extended periods 
of time. These operations fundamentally change the character of an area for 
the duration of fracking activities.57 The construction phase also creates 
 
would discharge to sewage treatment plants. For example, if a discharge of wastewater to a sewage 
treatment facility disrupts the treatment process of the facility (e.g., by killing the biological 
organisms that are used to treat sewage), that discharge would violate the Clean Water Act’s 
pretreatment rules. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.5(a)(1) (2011).  
55 Underground injection of wastewater from gas production operations may have triggered 
recent earthquakes in Ohio and Texas. See Pete Spotts, How Fracking Might Have Led to an Ohio 
Earthquake, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2012/ 
0102/How-fracking-might-have-led-to-an-Ohio-earthquake (noting that several cities have prohibited 
new wastewater-injection wells close to existing wells that have been linked to recent seismic 
activity). But see David J. Hayes, Is the Recent Increase in Felt Earthquakes in the Central US Natural 
or Manmade?, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Is-the-
Recent-Increase-in-Felt-Earthquakes-in-the-Central-US-Natural-or-Manmade.cfm (indicating that, 
while changes in the seismicity rate are likely manmade, there is no evidence linking fracking to an 
increased rate of earthquakes). 
56 See Don Hopey, Gas Drillers Recycling More Water, Using Fewer Chemicals, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/region/gas-drillers-
recycling-more-water-using-fewer-chemicals-210363 (describing one company’s wastewater-recycling 
progression used in the Marcellus Shale from 80% of its wastewater in 2009 to 90% in 2010, and its 
ultimate goal of 100% recycling in 2011). Recycling may be far more common in the Marcellus 
Shale than elsewhere due to the unavailability of inexpensive disposal methods in other states. 
Stephen Rassenfoss, From Flowback to Fracturing: Water Recycling Grows in the Marcellus Shale, J. 
PETROLEUM TECH., July 2011, at 48, 48, available at http://www.spe.org/jpt/print/archives/ 
2011/07/12Marcellus.pdf. In order to reuse wastewater in another fracking operation, the water 
must be treated to remove solids and elements that might otherwise inhibit fracking production. 
Id. at 50. For a description of one company’s proprietary recycling technology, see Marcellus Gas 
Well Hydrofracture Wastewater Disposal by Recycled Treatment Process, PROCHEMTECH INT’L, INC., 
http://www.prochemtech.com/Literature/TAB/PDF_TAB_Marcellus_Hydrofracture_Disposal_by_ 
Recycle_1009.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
57 See Ian Urbina & Jo Craven McGinty, Learning Too Late of Perils in Gas Well Leases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2011, at A1 (describing the negative impacts of fracking operations on the property 
of lessor landowners); see also Vicki Vaughan, Shale Play a Worry for Bexar Ozone, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS (May 23, 2012), http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Shale-play-a-
worry-for-Bexar-ozone-3581077.php (describing the effect of truck traffic in the Eagle Ford Shale 
in Texas on ozone levels in the region). 
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socioeconomic effects associated with “boom towns,” including rising prices 
and increased social dislocation.  
Fifth, the production of natural gas can release methane into the atmos-
phere through leaks in gas capture, gathering, storage, and transmission 
equipment. Because methane is an extremely potent greenhouse gas, 
methane releases may obviate any greenhouse gas–emission gains associated 
with the substitution of natural gas for coal in electricity production or 
other industrial operations.58 However, there remains considerable uncer-
tainty about the extent to which natural gas production and transmission 
operations produce these so-called fugitive methane emissions.59  
Finally, fracking operations can be associated with groundwater contam-
ination. Critics of fracking have suggested that fracking operations cause the 
seepage of methane or fracking fluids into groundwater wells.60 The vast 
majority of fracking operations fracture rock a mile or more beneath 
existing groundwater tables. In these situations, the probability of deep 
 
58 One widely reported study by Robert Howarth and others estimates that up to 7.9% of the 
methane produced from natural gas wells escapes into the atmosphere as the result of leaks or 
venting. See Robert W. Howarth et al., Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas 
from Shale Formations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE 679, 687 (2011) (finding that, within a “20-year 
horizon, the greenhouse gas footprint for shale gas is at least 20% greater than and perhaps more 
than twice as great as that for coal when expressed per quantity of energy available during 
combustion”); Gabrielle Pétron et al., Hydrocarbon Emissions Characterization in the Colorado Front 
Range: A Pilot Study, J. GEOPHYS. RES., Feb. 2012, at 1 (suggesting that existing estimates of fugitive 
methane emissions from gas operations are conservative); cf. LAWRENCE M. CATHLES, THE 8% 
VS. 2% DEBATE: COMMENTS ON SELECTED PAPERS (2012), http://www.geo.cornell.edu/eas/ 
PeoplePlaces/Faculty/cathles/Gas%20Blog%20PDFs/0%20Comments%20on%20selected%20Papers.pdf 
(reporting a leakage rate of between 2% and 4%); Michael Levi, Yellow Flags on a New Methane 
Study, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 13, 2012), http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/02/13/ yellow-
flags-on-a-new-methane-study (identifying methodological problems and inaccurate assumptions with 
the Pétron study). 
59 A report from Cambridge Energy Research Associates contends that the Howarth study is 
plagued by methodological errors that resulted in an overestimate of methane emissions from gas 
production operations. MARY LASHLEY BARCELLA ET AL., CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH 
ASSOCS., MEASURING METHANE: ESTIMATING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM 
UPSTREAM NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT 9-10 (2011), available at http://www.ihs.com/info/ 
en/a/mis-measuring-methane-report.aspx (identifying a number of methodological problems, 
including an assumption that “all flowback methane is vented, when industry practice is to capture 
and market as much [methane] as possible, flaring much of the rest”); see also David A. Kirchgess-
ner et al., Estimate of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, 35 CHEMOSPHERE 
1365, 1366 (1997) (noting that most studies on methane emissions measure “unaccounted for gas,” 
which consistently leads to overestimates). 
60 See, e.g., Mike Soroghan, Baffled about Fracking? You’re Not Alone, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/13/13greenwire-baffled-about-fracking-youre-not-alone-
44383.html (noting a “well-known [water] contamination case” in Dimock, Pennsylvania, where 
fracking operations caused methane to seep into local wells). For a fuller discussion of government 
and academic studies of groundwater contamination associated with fracking, see infra subsection 
IV.A.5. 
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fractures causing methane or fracking fluids to migrate upward into 
groundwater tables seems very small.61 However, a fracking operation may 
nevertheless cause groundwater contamination in any of three ways. First, if 
the natural gas well is poorly constructed, methane or fracturing fluids 
might leak from the well while passing through groundwater tables at 
shallow depths. Second, if fracking fluid constituents are improperly 
handled on the surface, they may be spilled and seep into groundwater 
tables.62 Third, the disposal of wastewater or other wastes on site, if permit-
ted by law or the lease, can result in groundwater contamination if and 
when lagoons or other disposal facilities leak.63  
Much of the controversy surrounding fracking focuses on these impacts 
and the adequacy of the regulatory regimes available to minimize, mitigate, 
or prevent those impacts. In 2009, Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation entered 
into a consent decree in which it agreed to pay a $120,000 fine and to 
provide fresh water to residents of Dimock, Pennsylvania, whose drinking 
water wells were contaminated with methane.64 While the settlement did 
not establish the cause of the methane contamination, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection subsequently banned Cabot from 
using fracking in the region.65 The presence of methane in Pennsylvania 
wells inspired the Academy Award–nominated documentary GasLand, 
which has rallied opposition to fracking—particularly in the Marcellus 
 
61 However, in some places (e.g., portions of the Marcellus Shale), shale gas is found at shal-
lower depths. While the industry is able to measure the size and location of fractures produced by 
fracking operations, it is not always able to predict the degree of fracturing. This uncertainty gives 
rise to the possibility that a fracturing operation could cause methane or fracturing fluids to seep 
into groundwater tables. 
62 See Soroghan, supra note 60 (“[M]ethane contamination is not caused by injecting chemi-
cals down the well. It is caused by bad well construction during drilling.”). 
63 See Urbina & McGinty, supra note 57 (describing the effects of fracking operations in 
which operators merely covered, rather than removed, waste after the projects’ completion). 
64 Michael Rubinkam, Pa. Regulators Suspend Cabot Oil & Gas Drilling Over Contamination of 
Wells in Pa., MINN. STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul) (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.startribune. 
com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=90960344. Similar claims have been brought against 
Southwest Energy Production Company and Atlas Energy. See Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 
763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (discussing allegations that Southwest’s water contami-
nation “has not only exposed Plaintiffs to hazardous materials and created the possibility of 
causing present and future health problems, but it has also lowered the value of [their] proper-
ties”); Jon Hurdle, Pennsylvania Lawsuit Says Drilling Polluted Water, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/09/us-fracking-suit-idUSTRE5A80PP20091109 (discuss-
ing the lawsuit of a private citizen against Atlas for allegedly polluting his soil and water). 
65 Rubinkam, supra note 64. For an analysis of the factual issues at play in groundwater con-
tamination claims in the Marcellus Shale, see Lynn Kerr McKay et al., Science and the Reasonable 
Development of Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Resources in Pennsylvania and New York, 32 ENERGY 
L.J., 125, 138-43 (2011). Pennsylvania subsequently lifted that ban. Michael Rubinkam, Cabot 
Allowed to Resume Fracking in Dimock Twp., TIMES-LEADER (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.), Aug. 21, 2012, at 6A. 
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Shale region.66 More recently, the EPA concluded in late 2011 that fracking 
fluids had contaminated a drinking water aquifer near the town of Pavillion, 
Wyoming,67  though the industry disputes that conclusion.68  These and 
other incidents69 prompted the EPA study of the environmental effects of 
fracking on water resources.70 The EPA expects to announce the prelimi-
nary results of the study in late 2012, with final results anticipated in 2014.71  
Thus, significant uncertainty remains regarding the magnitude and fre-
quency of the negative effects of fracking. This uncertainty is reflected in the 
contrasting and evolving approaches taken by states in fracking regulation.  
II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
A. Federal Regulation 
1. Overview of Oil, Natural Gas, and Environmental Regulation 
There is no comprehensive federal licensing regime for onshore oil and 
gas development. To the contrary, the regulation of oil and natural gas 
exploration and production in the United States has always been primarily a 
state matter. Economic motives drove the earliest government interventions 
into oil and gas production. From the discovery of oil in western Pennsyl-
vania in the mid-nineteenth century, through subsequent discoveries in 
Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, the American oil and gas industry experienced a series of boom–
 
66 Some Pennsylvania residents have accused the state’s environmental agency of turning a 
blind eye to contamination of drinking-water wells by gas drilling operations. See Pa. Woman: 
Chemicals in My Water in Drilling Area, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
APe8e13e02557d4e98ad3d2b92eda99448.html (noting that the state’s Department of Environmen-
tal Protection “failed to do follow-up tests” when it suspected contamination). 
67 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., EPA, 600/R-00-/000, DRAFT: INVESTIGATION OF 
GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING 33 (2011) (finding evidence of 
wellwater contamination resulting from fracking operations through the use of both shallow and 
deep monitoring wells). 
68 Indep. Petrol. Ass’n of Am., Six—Actually, Seven—Questions for EPA on Pavillion, ENERGY 
IN DEPTH, http://www.energyindepth.org/six-questions-for-EPA-on-pavillion (last updated May 
21, 2012). 
69 In April 2011, Chesapeake Energy, a major shale gas producer in Pennsylvania, suffered a 
blowout of one of its wells, causing spills of drilling fluids. Edward McAllister, Chesapeake Stems 
Flow from Blown Pennsylvania Gas Well, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/04/22/us-chesapeake-blowout-idUSTRE73K5OH20110422. 
70 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., supra note 16. 
71 Id. at 7. 
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bust cycles, accompanied by wild swings in oil prices.72 These cycles were 
precipitated and exacerbated by the common law “rule of capture,” which 
permitted any single owner of mineral rights in a multi-owner oilfield to 
produce as much oil as possible from that field.73 In addition to its effects on 
prices, the rule of capture led to tremendous waste, because it provided a 
disincentive for owners to manage production (for example, by coordinating 
the placement of wells and production rates from those wells) and maintain 
pressure levels in the field. This disincentive resulted in production that 
was both physically and economically inefficient.74 After the discovery of 
the massive east Texas field in 1930, which exacerbated over-supply prob-
lems and depressed prices, producers appealed to their governments to step 
in.75 State legislatures in oil-producing states began enacting “conservation 
statutes,” which authorized state regulators to organize production so as to 
promote efficiency.76 This kind of state-managed production eventually 
grew to include some basic environmental, health, and safety standards 
governing well construction and other aspects of the work.77 In states like 
Texas and Oklahoma, these state conservation commissions continue to 
regulate natural gas production today.  
Most environmental regulation, however, is of more recent vintage. The 
modern environmental movement is a post–World War II phenomenon, 
which eventually led to the federal environmental regulatory regime in 
 
72 For a comprehensive description of these cycles in the U.S. prior to World War II, see 
generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER chs. 
1-17 (1991); James Stafford, The Real Reason Behind Oil Price Rises—An Interview with James 
Hamilton, OILPRICE.COM (Aug. 28, 2012), http://oilprice.com/Interviews/The-Real-Reason-Behind-
Oil-Price-Rises-An-Interview-with-James-Hamilton.html. 
73 Specifically, the “rule of capture” specifies that no single owner of a portion of the field 
may prevent an adjoining landowner from producing oil and gas from the field, even if that 
production pulls minerals out from under adjoining lots. For an illustration of the rule of capture at 
work, see Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 801-03 (Pa. 1907). For an analysis of 
the modern rule of capture and its effects, see Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of 
Capture: An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 925-33 (2005). 
74 Production by multiple owners of a single field constitutes a classic prisoner’s dilemma. 
While the parties might wish to cooperate in order to maximize production from a single field, 
there is a temptation for individual owners to defect from any cooperative arrangement, and 
garner more revenue for themselves. However, if all parties to the agreement defect, the market 
for oil is glutted, and prices fall. 
75 YERGIN, supra note 72, at 231-37. 
76 The process of managing the rights of multiple owners of a single oilfield involves prorat-
ing production and sharing revenues. State commissions, like the Railroad Commission of Texas 
and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, oversee these processes. For a brief history of the 
early proration orders issued by the Texas and Oklahoma commissions, see STEPHEN L. 
MACDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 36-37 (1971). 
77 For examples of these rules, see infra Section II.B. 
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existence today. During the 1970s, Congress passed most of the major 
statutes that still regulate environmental health and safety,78 including:  
(1) the Clean Air Act (CAA)79 and the Clean Water Act (CWA),80 which 
required permits and compliance with federal standards for air and water 
emissions respectively; (2) major hazardous waste regulatory legislation, 
such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); 81 and (3) 
public health and safety protection laws, such as the Safe Drinking Water 
Act (SDWA),82 which established federal drinking water protection stand-
ards, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act),83 which 
established health and safety standards for the workplace. 
2. Regulatory Exemptions for Oil and Gas Development 
However, this federal regulatory superstructure does not always regulate 
environmental, health, and safety risks associated with fracking in the same 
way it regulates other industries. Fracking operations enjoy some exemp-
tions from federal environmental regulation.84 For example, the SDWA 
regulates underground injections “which endanger[] drinking water 
sources”85—including underground injection of oil and gas wastes—through 
its underground injection well permitting program.86 However, the definition 
 
78 Some commentators have referred to this period of intense growth in federal environmental 
regulation as “the environmental decade.” Political scientist Lettie Wenner may have been the first to 
coin this phrase. See LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982). 
79 Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)). 
80 Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387). 
81 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–
6992k). The RCRA authorizes the EPA to promulgate “cradle to grave” regulations of hazardous 
waste generation, transport, treatment, storage, and disposal. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(4). 
82 Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26). 
83 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–700). 
84 For extensive surveys of federal and state regulations of fracking operations, see CHARLES 
P. GROAT & THOMAS W. GRIMSHAW, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INSTITUTE, FACT-
BASED REGULATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 33-
55 (2012), and Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas 
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 142-67 (2009). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1).  
86 See id. § 300h(b)(1)(A) (“Such regulations shall require that a State program . . . shall 
prohibit . . . any underground injection in such State which is not authorized by a permit issued 
by the State (except that the regulations may permit a State to authorize underground injection by 
rule) . . . .”); id. § 300h-4(a) (providing that underground injection operations are permitted if the 
State demonstrates that “such portion of the State program meets the requirements of subparagraphs 
(A) through (D) of section 300h(b)(1) . . . and represents an effective program (including adequate 
recordkeeping and reporting) to prevent underground injection which endangers drinking water 
sources”). 
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of “underground injection” was amended to exclude “the underground 
injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to 
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production 
activities.”87 This provision means that fracking operations do not require 
underground-injection-well permits under the SDWA. The history of the 
exemption can be traced to an EPA decision in the 1990s to exempt fracking 
because the principal function of fracking operations is not the injection of 
fluids into the ground (disposal), but rather gas production.88 After an EPA 
study concluded that the injection of fracking fluids into coalbed methane89 
wells poses little or no threat to drinking water sources,90 Congress enacted 
the statutory exemption. It should be noted, however, that underground 
injection of wastewater from fracking operations is subject to SDWA 
permitting requirements.  
In addition, there is no federal law requiring the disclosure of the com-
position of fracking fluids to environmental regulators.91 The Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 92  the primary federal 
hazardous chemicals disclosure law, requires that industries annually submit 
to the EPA a “Toxic Chemical Release Form” describing the specific toxic 
chemicals in their industrial processes and the methods of disposal for 
each. 93  However, the Toxic Chemical Release Form requirement only 
applies to industries within specific Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
 
87 Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).  
88 See Brief of Respondent at 13, Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 
(11th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-6501), 1995 WL 17057927 (“EPA has . . . never interpreted ‘well 
injection’ to include hydraulic fracturing operations related to methane production. Rather, EPA 
has focused the [underground injection control] program on regulation of wells at which the 
‘principal function’ is underground emplacement of fluids, not wells at which any ‘emplacement’ is 
wholly incidental to production.” (citation omitted)). 
89 Coalbed methane is natural gas (methane) that is found in coal seams. See KRAMER, supra 
note 22, at 160-61. 
90 OFFICE OF GROUND WATER & DRINKING WATER, EPA, 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION 
OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY FRACKING OF COALBED 
METHANE RESERVES 7-5 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_ 
attach_uic_ch07_conclusions.pdf.  
91 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed a rule in May 2012 that would require 
disclosure of fracturing fluid constituents in connection with fracking operations on BLM lands. 
Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and Indian Lands, 77 
Fed Reg. 27,691, 27,710 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). The 
proposed rule would also establish certain wellbore construction rules and rules governing the 
handling and disposal of produced and flow backwater from fracking operations on BLM lands. Id. 
at 27,710-11. 
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050. 
93 Id. § 11023(a)–(b). 
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Codes.94 Oil and gas production operations fall within SIC code 13,95 and 
are exempt from the requirement to file the form. Consequently, people 
concerned about the contamination of their groundwater by fracking fluids 
cannot use the Toxic Chemical Release Inventory96 to determine whether 
their wells have been contaminated by a particular fracturing operation. On 
the other hand, some alternative forms of information are available. Federal 
law, for example, requires fracturing operators to file material safety data 
sheets for each hazardous chemical present at the job site with local gov-
ernments.97 Additionally, the website fracfocus.org—a voluntary industry 
disclosure effort—assembles and publishes information about the contents 
of fracking fluid mixtures from individual wells.98 Furthermore, transporta-
tion of hazardous chemicals to and from the jobsite may be covered by 
reporting requirements under the Hazardous Materials Transportation 
Act.99 Legislation to require disclosure of the specific fracking fluid mix-
tures used in each fracturing operation was introduced into the 111th 
Congress100 but never came to a vote there.101 
Finally, wastewater produced by fracking enjoys the same exemption 
from the RCRA’s hazardous waste disposal regulations that applies to all oil 
and gas wastes. The RCRA regulatory regime requires generators, trans-
porters, and disposers of hazardous wastes to comply with a variety of 
 
94  See EPA, EPA 260-R-10-001, TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE INVENTORY REPORTING 
FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS 1 (2011) (listing the industries to which the toxic chemical release 
form applies, and not listing SIC code 13). Originally, the requirement applied only to owners and 
operators of facilities that are in SIC codes 20-39, the manufacturing industries. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11023(b)(1)(A). While the EPA has expanded its coverage somewhat, the requirement remains 
inapplicable to the natural gas–production industry.  
95 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Standard Industrial Classification Manual, Major Group 13: Oil and 
Gas Extraction, OSHA, http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.display?id=8&tab=group (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
96 The Inventory is the publicly available compendium of information aggregated from all 
the submitted toxic chemical release forms. To access the inventory, see Toxic Release Inventory, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last updated Oct. 16, 2012). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 11021. 
98 See FRACFOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://fracfocus.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2012). 
99 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101—5127; see also id. § 5110 (shipping papers and disclosure); 49 C.F.R. 
§ 171.15 (incident disclosure rules). 
100 The bill was called the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) 
Act. H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009). 
101 It was introduced into the 112th Congress, as well, in March of 2011 but never came to a 
vote. See Thomas, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (click “Word/ 
Phrase”; enter “FRAC” in text box; click “Search”) (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
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(sometimes very expensive) regulatory requirements.102 RCRA delegated to 
the EPA the task of developing precise definitions of hazardous wastes 
covered by the regulatory regime.103 In December 1978, the EPA issued 
proposed rules defining the types of hazardous characteristics that would 
bring solid wastes within the definition of hazardous wastes.104 In so doing, 
the EPA indicated that “certain very large volume wastes,” including “gas 
and oil drilling muds and oil production brines,”105 may be hazardous but 
would be difficult to regulate because the EPA lacks information about their 
risks, which appear to be low.106 This exemption was codified in the 1980 
amendments to the RCRA.107 Consequently, the disposal of wastewater from 
fracking operations is not subject to the regulation of hazardous waste under 
the RCRA.108 That does not mean, however, that disposal of fracking wastes 
is entirely unregulated at the federal level. The CWA and SDWA regulate 
certain methods by which wastewater from fracking operations is disposed.109  
Thus, despite federal regulation, the fact that fracking operations enjoy 
certain exemptions from some of these federal regulations has exacerbated 
fears surrounding those operations. 
 
102 See Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
lawsregs/laws/rcra.html (providing basic information about the implementation, compliance, 
enforcement, and history of the RCRA). 
103 The RCRA mandated that the EPA should “develop and promulgate criteria for identify-
ing the characteristics of hazardous waste, and for listing hazardous waste, . . . taking into account 
toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and other 
related factors.” 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1976).  
104 Hazardous Waste Guidelines and Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 58,955-57 (Dec. 18, 
1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 25). 
105 Id. at 58,991. 
106 Id. at 58,991-92.  
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1981) (“[D]rilling fluids, produced waters, and 
other wastes associated with the . . . production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy 
shall be subject only to existing State or Federal regulatory programs in lieu of this subchapter 
until . . . after promulgation of [certain] regulations . . . .”). In 1988, the EPA issued a report 
explaining the basis for the exemption. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geother-
mal Exploration, Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446 (July 6, 1988). The 
EPA explained that (1) adopting RCRA Subtitle C requirements would result in impractical 
burdens or “disruption and, in some cases, duplication” of state regimes; (2) compliance with 
current state and federal requirements for management and disposal would prevent most cases of 
damage to health and the environment; and (3) the oil and natural gas industry, as well as 
consumers, would suffer from the prohibitive costs of regulation. Id. at 25,454-56. 
108 Presumably, most fracking fluids do not exhibit the characteristics of hazardous waste, as 
any toxic constituents present comprise a minute fraction of the mixture. However, the RCRA 
generally treats a mixture as a hazardous waste if any nonexempted ingredient of the mixture is a 
hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv) (2012). 
109 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
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B. State Regulation 
State regulation of fracking operations varies considerably but has 
grown beyond the mere regulation of property rights and production rates 
to include environmental (or quasi-environmental) regulation as well.110 The 
two right-hand columns in Table 2 below illustrate the growth of natural gas 
production (driven primarily by fracking) in three American states containing 
large shale gas deposits.111 Texas has been at the forefront of shale gas 
production, doubling the number of wells in the state between 2000 and 
2009.112 It has done so by exploiting the Barnett Shale in northern Texas113 
and other shale deposits within the state, most recently the Eagle Ford 
Shale in southern Texas.114 Similarly, New York and Pennsylvania overlay 
the huge Marcellus Shale. Gas production in Pennsylvania has seen sharp 
increases over the last decade, but production in New York has not.115 All 
three states have had, for some time, regulatory regimes governing the 
construction of oil and gas wells.116 Why then have Texas and Pennsylvania 
seen a strong surge in natural gas production and fracking over the last 
decade while New York has not? Variation in these states’ regulatory 
approaches to fracking accounts for the lion’s share of this disparity. Texas 
and Pennsylvania have chosen to apply their existing regulatory regimes for 
natural gas production to fracking operations (though both states revised 
their rules in early 2012117). New York State decided to impose a moratorium 
 
110 A thorough review of state regulatory standards is beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
good description of state regulation of fracking, see Wiseman, supra note 84, at 142-67; and 
GROAT & GRIMSHAW, supra note 84, at 33-55. 
111 See infra Table 2. 
112  See id. 
113 See Newark, East (Barnett Shale) Drilling Permits Issued (1993 Through June 2012), RAILROAD 
COMMISSION TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/drillingpermitsissued.pdf (showing a 
peak of 4145 Barnett Shale drilling permits in 2008) (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
114 Texas Eagle Ford Shale Drilling Permits Issued 2008 Through September 2012, RAILROAD COM-
MISSION TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/eagleford/EagleFordDrillingPermitsIssued.pdf (estimating 
that 4293 permits will be issued for Eagle Ford Shale drilling through 2012) (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012); see also Robert W. Gilmer et al., Oil Boom in Eagle Ford Shale Brings New Wealth to South 
Texas, SW. ECON., 2d Quarter 2012, at 3, 3 (calling Eagle Ford “[p]erhaps the largest discovery of 
new oil reserves in the United States since . . . 1968”). 
115 See infra Table 2. 
116 For a description of these regimes, see infra notes 126-139 and accompanying text. 
117 In January 2012, the Railroad Commission of Texas promulgated new rules requiring 
operators to provide additional information about the makeup of fracturing fluids and other 
information about their operations. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c) (2012). Pennsylvania also 
adopted new rules to regulate fracking in February 2012. See Corbett Signs Shale Well Impact Fee into 
Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/12045/ 
1210009-503.stm (“[T]he measure . . . will charge drillers a per-well fee, update state environmen-
tal regulations and subject local zoning ordinances to state-crafted standards.”). For a more 
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on fracking while it studied the effects of the practice.118 The Governor 
appeared poised to lift the moratorium in anticipation of the establishment 
of new regulatory standards proposed in the fall of 2011.119 In the summer of 
2012, there were reports that the ban could remain in place in all but a few 
New York counties.120 As of this writing, the Governor of New York has 
restarted the rulemaking process, leaving the full ban in place pending its 
completion.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
comprehensive description of the regulatory changes that have taken place in Pennsylvania since 
2009, see McKay et al., supra note 65, at 132-34. 
118 The New York ban, enacted by executive order of the Governor, required further envi-
ronmental review of high-volume fracking in the Marcellus Shale. Exec. Order No. 41 (N.Y.) 
(Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/executiveorders/EO41.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012). It followed the Governor’s veto of state legislation imposing a much 
broader ban. See Governor David Paterson’s Veto Message No. 6837 (Dec. 10, 2010), vetoing S.B. 
8129-B, Leg. 233d Sess. (N.Y. 2010). The veto and executive order both followed an announce-
ment by the Delaware River Basin Commission that natural gas producers must apply for 
commission approval before drilling in shale formations that lie within the Delaware River basin. 
See Carol R. Collier, Del. River Basin Comm’n, Determination of the Executive Director 
Concerning Natural Gas Extraction Activities in Shale Formations Within the Drainage Area of 
Special Protection Waters (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/ 
documents/EDD5-19-09.pdf (providing official notification of the new approval process to gas 
extraction project sponsors). For a report detailing various responses to Governor Andrew 
Cuomo’s efforts to lift the moratorium on fracking, see Danny Hakim & Nicolas Confessore, Cuomo 
Moving to End a Freeze on Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A1.  
119 The proposed rules were detailed in a Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact 
Statement published by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation. See N.Y. 
STATE DEP’T. OF ENVTL. CONSERV’N, supra note 43, at ch. 3. 
120 See Danny Hakim, Cuomo Proposal Would Restrict Gas Drilling to Struggling Region, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A1 (reporting that the ban would be lifted in only a few economically 
distressed communities in New York’s southern tier that have passed resolutions in favor of the 
drilling process). 
121 See Danny Hakim, Shift by Cuomo Clouds Future of Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at A1. 
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Table 2: Natural Gas Development and Regulation, Three States122 
 
A comparison of the regulatory regimes of these states illustrates im-
portant similarities and differences among them. With respect to operational 
requirements for gas production generally, the Texas rules are more specific 
and prescriptive than either the Pennsylvania or New York rules.123 For 
example, the Pennsylvania well-construction rules are comparatively more 
general, and are expressed as performance standards. Casing, for example, 
must be “of sufficient cemented length and strength to attach proper well 
control equipment and prevent blowouts, explosions, fires and casing 
failures.”124 The New York rules are even more general, requiring simply 
that “sufficient surface” casing extends “below the deepest potable fresh 
water level.”125 All three states’ regimes establish requirements governing 
well construction and include provisions to ensure that the cement casing is 
sufficient to prevent gas or other materials in the well from finding their 
way into the surrounding earth and groundwater. However, the Texas rules 
specify exactly where the well casing must be constructed within the well,126 
 
122 The data in Table 2 come from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and are 
available for download at Number of Producing Gas Wells, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_wells_s1_a.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 2012). 
123 See infra notes 126-139 and accompanying text. 
124 25 PA. CODE § 78.71(a) (2011). Similarly, rather than specify the depth of surface casing, 
the rules state that the operator must ensure that the casing is of sufficient depth to protect 
groundwater. Id. § 78.73(b).  
125 N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 554.1(d) (2011). 
126 The Texas rules require cement casing “from the shoe [the bottom of the surface casing] 
to a point at least 600 feet above the shoe.” 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13(b)(3)(A) (2003). 
 
Regulator 
Number of Wells 
(Production) 2000
Number of Wells 
(Production) 2009 
Texas 
 
Railroad Commission 
of Texas 48,609 93,507 
Pennsylvania 
 
Pa. Department of 
Environmental 
Protection 
30,000 57,356 
New York 
N.Y. State  
Department of 
Environmental 
Conservation
5304 6628 
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the materials to be used,127 and how the casing is to be cemented and 
pressure tested.128  
Similarly, the Texas rules regarding blowout preventers are specific, 
requiring “a minimum of two remotely controlled hydraulic ram-type 
blowout preventers,” with specified characteristics. 129  In contrast, the 
Pennsylvania and New York rules are less specific, and more likely to be 
articulated as performance standards.130 These state regimes also differ with 
respect to other topics, including operational standards and waste disposal.  
All three states now require that operators disclose, in some form, the 
contents of their fracking fluids. Texas requires disclosure of fracking fluid 
constituents on a well-by-well basis using the website fracfocus.org.131 New 
York’s proposed rules require that applications for fracking permits disclose 
fracking fluid constituents to the New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation (DEC); the rules also prohibit the use of constituents 
not included in the permit application.132 Pennsylvania’s spill prevention 
guidelines require disclosure of fracking fluid constituents within six days 
following the conclusion of fracking.133  
With respect to waste disposal requirements, however, the Pennsylvania 
and New York rules are more stringent than the Texas rules. For example, 
the Texas rules specifically permit operators to construct and utilize pits for 
the storage of various liquids used during natural gas production, but require 
a separate permit to dispose of liquid wastes in pits or underground.134 In 
contrast, the Pennsylvania rules contain detailed construction requirements 
for pits used to store liquids during operations, such as the requirement that 
 
127 See id. § 3.13(b)(1)(A) (specifying that “all casing cemented in any well shall be steel 
casing”); id. § 3.13(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that the cement casing be installed by the “pump and 
plug method”); id. § 3.13(b)(2)(C) (detailing the quality of cement to be used). 
128 Id. § 1.13(b)(1)(A)(requiring the use of hydrostatic pressure testing). 
129 16 TEX. ADMIN. § 3.13(c)(2)(B). 
130 For example, the Pennsylvania rules require blowout preventers only under certain condi-
tions, 25 PA. CODE § 78.72(a) (2011), while the New York rules stipulate that “[w]ellhead 
connections adequate to control blowouts will be employed,” including blowout preventers, “[i]n 
areas where the subsurface formations and pressures are unknown or uncertain.” N.Y. R. & REGS. 
§ 554.3(b) & .4(c). 
131 See 16 TEX. ADMIN. § 3.29(c)(2) (requiring operators of fracking wells to complete the 
form posted on the fracking chemical registry website). 
132 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV’N, supra note 43, at 8-30; see also N.Y. R. & 
REGS. § 560.3(c) (proposed Sept. 28, 2011) (requiring disclosure of each fracking fluid additive 
and the proposed volume of each additive with each application for permit). 
133 Act of Feb. 14, 2012, P.L. 87, No. 13, § 3222.1(b) (Pa.) (to be codified at 58 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 3222.1(b) (West 2012)).  
134 16 TEX. ADMIN. §§ 3.8(d)(4), 3.9(1). The rules governing disposal wells require consulta-
tion with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and compliance with that agency’s 
rules. Id. §§ 3.8(J)(1)(B)(i) & 3.9(2). 
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the pits contain a synthetic liner of specified thickness and integrity, and 
that the bottom of the pit be “at least 20 inches above the seasonal high 
groundwater table.”135 The rules for waste disposal include requirements for 
surface-water disposal, disposal to municipal sewage treatment plants, and 
on-site or underground disposal. 136  The New York rules prohibit the 
pollution of land, surface water, or groundwater from natural gas produc-
tion activities,137 and prohibit the storage or retention of oil in earthen 
reservoirs.138 Moreover, New York’s proposed rules would impose environ-
mental requirements far more thorough and stringent than those of either 
Pennsylvania or Texas, including aggressive setback requirements from 
aquifers and other environmental resources and requiring the use of tanks 
rather than pits for onsite storage.139  
One might speculate that the differences between these state regulatory 
regimes correlate with the variant natures of the missions of the agencies 
given primary jurisdiction over natural gas production operations in each 
state. In Texas, where the primary regulator is the oil and gas commission, 
natural gas operations regulations seem relatively detailed but less directly 
focused on environmental protection; in New York and Pennsylvania, 
where the primary regulators are environmental agencies, the operational 
rules are general but the waste-disposal rules seem particularly strong and 
detailed. A well-established literature within political science attributes 
substantive importance to these delegation decisions, arguing that politicians 
can steer an agency in particular policy directions by establishing its mission. 
In other words, those attracted to work for an agency will tend to exhibit 
policy preferences that are consistent with its statutory mission.140 Agencies 
 
135 25 PA. CODE §§ 78.56(a)(4)(i), (iii).  
136 Id. § 78.55-60. 
137 N.Y. R. & REGS. § 556.5(a). 
138 Id. § 556.4(a). 
139 For a complete description of the proposed rule in New York, see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. CONSERV’N, supra note 43. For a comparison of various state rules, see GROAT & 
GRIMSHAW, supra note 84, at 6-1 to -31. 
140 This argument has become known as the “structure and process” hypothesis, and is asso-
ciated with Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (sometimes known collectively 
in the literature as “McNollgast”). See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 
253-64 (1987) (exploring the principles of political control of bureaucratic decisions through 
oversight and administrative procedure); Matthew [sic] D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political 
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-45 (1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and 
Process] (arguing that where legislative specificity is not possible, elected officials can ensure the 
achievement of policy goals by carefully structuring the processes of administrative agencies). 
Similarly, Jonathan Macey has emphasized the ways in which politicians can “hardwire” an agency 
in support of a particular policy perspective through structural choices, such as defining the 
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like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or state oil and 
gas commissions were created explicitly to regulate and promote certain 
types of energy development, and we can infer that those agencies’ missions 
influence difficult policy choices. We can further infer that politicians 
understand this dynamic, and allocate regulatory authority with it in mind.141 
Based upon this idea of mission-orientation, it follows that the New 
York and Pennsylvania legislatures allocated responsibility for regulating 
natural gas production to their environmental agencies to emphasize 
environmental issues in the natural gas regulatory process, and to ensure 
that environmental values are not ignored or given inadequate considera-
tion. Correspondingly, it also follows that the Texas legislature sought to 
promote natural gas development without an emphasis on environmental 
values by delegating regulatory responsibility to the Railroad Commission 
of Texas. New York’s moratorium and stringent proposed rules appear to 
support these inferences. On the other hand, though Pennsylvania’s envi-
ronmental rules are more specific than Texas’s, it does not appear that 
Pennsylvania’s regulation of natural gas production (and of fracking in 
particular) is generally more environmentally stringent than regulation is in 
Texas. Furthermore, while Texas relies upon the Railroad Commission to 
regulate gas production, the law specifies a role for the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to manage waste disposal and other 
pollution-related aspects of gas production.142 From this small sample, it is 
difficult to discern any correlation between agency mission and regulatory 
stringency when it comes to the regulation of fracking. Rather, this snap-
shot highlights the remarkable variety of states’ regulatory approaches and 
 
agency’s mission, establishing its internal organizational structure, and choosing its location within 
the larger executive branch. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control 
of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 99-108 (1992). Macey has also argued that 
using structural design and process to shape the policy outcomes of administrative agencies has 
important limitations. See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The 
Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675-702 (1992) [hereinafter Macey, 
Separated Powers] (noting that the efforts of Congress and the President to influence the policy 
outcomes of an administrative agency are limited by judicial review and by the power of subse-
quent Presidents to redirect the orientation of the agency at a later time).  
141 See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 140, at 468-81 (describing legislators’ use 
of structure and process to constrain and anticipate agency decisions in the context of environmen-
tal regulation); see also Arthur Lupia & Matthew [sic] McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountabil-
ity, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 106-10 (1994) (discussing ways in which legislatures design 
agencies to retain effective control and oversight over their policy agendas). 
142 See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.30 (2012) (spelling out the jurisdictional relationship 
between the Railroad Commission of Texas and the TCEQ in connection with oil and gas 
production, and assigning to TCEQ jurisdiction over hazardous waste disposal, stormwater, 
underground injection wells, and various other externalities of gas production). 
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their ongoing efforts to adapt to emerging information about the risks of 
shale gas production. 
Alternatively, these different regulatory approaches may reflect different 
attitudes toward risk and regulation among the people in each state. Figure 
1 below summarizes the results of the Spring 2012 University of Texas 
Energy Poll,143 which asked respondents nationwide about their attitudes 
toward fracking. It is clear from the data that Texans think differently about 
fracking than do residents of New York or Pennsylvania. Not only are 
Texans more likely to support fracking than are New Yorkers or Pennsylva-
nians, but New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians also express far more support 
than do Texans for the notion that fracking needs more regulation. 
 
Figure 1: University of Texas Energy Poll, Spring 2012 
Q1: Based on what you know or have heard, please indicate the degree to 
which you support or oppose the use of fracking in the extraction of fossil fuels. 
 
  Total Tex. Pa. N.Y. 
Support 48% 57% 48% 39% 
Oppose 36% 22% 41% 45% 
Neither 15% 16% 10% 17% 
Don’t Know 2% 4% 1% 0% 
 
Q2: Which of the following best describes your feelings  
about regulation for fracking? 
 
  Total Tex. Pa. N.Y. 
More regulation needed 38% 17% 58% 49% 
Sufficient regulation, but 
need more enforcement 
22% 35% 30% 17% 
Sufficient regulation 16% 21% 10% 9% 
Too much regulation 14% 20% 1% 23% 
Don’t know 10% 8% 2% 3% 
 
143 Data available upon request from the author and from the University of Texas, McCombs 
School of Business Energy Management and Innovation Center. 
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III. FEDERALISM AND ENERGY REGULATION 
Different states have responded to the shale gas rush in different ways, 
and the EPA’s study of fracking may yield proposals for new federal 
regulation. Meanwhile, the question remains: is new federal regulation 
necessary or even advisable? Should the EPA establish comprehensive risk-
regulation governing fracking operations (while permitting states to impose 
more stringent standards)?144 Should Congress create a federal licensing 
regime for fracking operations, one that preempts state and local laws? Or 
should the federal government leave these issues to the states? Of course, 
Congress retains the constitutional right to regulate activities that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.145 There seems little doubt that 
natural gas production and its environmental externalities have a sufficient 
connection with interstate commerce to justify federal regulation. That 
question of legal authority, however, is distinct from the normative question 
of whether states or federal regulators are better suited to regulate in any 
particular instance.146 This federalism problem can be conceptualized by 
putting policy first—that is, by determining the “right” policy and then 
determining which level of government can better implement it. Alterna-
tively, one can take a policy-neutral approach and ask which level of 
government is better suited to determine the “right” policy. This Article 
follows the latter approach because it puts the federalism question first, and 
there remains significant disagreement over the correct answers to the 
factual questions on which a “right” policy would be based.  
A. Federalism and Regulation, Generally 
1. Logical Rationales for Federal Regulation 
The scholarly literature on American regulatory federalism is diverse.147 
Some scholars approach this issue in rational choice terms, modeling it as a 
 
144 See Jody Freeman, Op-Ed., The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2012, at A23 (advocating a “cooperative federalism” approach to fracking regulation). 
145 See supra note 17. 
146 See Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of American 
Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 616-17 (2003) (arguing that whether an 
activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce “says nothing about the general need for 
federal resource regulation”).  
147 For some influential examples of this literature, see Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. 
Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71 
(1999); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, 
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV 1484 
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problem of aggregating preferences and responding to market failure.148 
Others reject the rational choice approach, arguing that it misses important 
values that ought to be considered in addressing questions of federalism.149 
 
(1987); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994); and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954).  
148 This tradition includes economists and rational-choice political scientists who model this 
problem as one of maximizing social welfare (the aggregated utility of individuals). Under this 
approach, regulatory authority ought to be exercised by the level of government that is able to 
translate individual preferences into policy choices most accurately. This tradition arose out of a 
seminal article in the economics literature by Charles Tiebout. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416, 419-20 (1956) (describing a “model [that] 
yields a solution for the level of expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences 
of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level”). For examples 
of the application of this rational-choice approach to regulatory federalism questions, see William 
A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities, 
in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 119, 125-43 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates 
eds., 1975); James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-
Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 323, 335-41 (1974); Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental 
Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 209-22 (1974). See also Johnston, supra note 146, at 614 (arguing 
that centralization may “inefficiently stifle development in order to transfer economic rents across 
jurisdictions”); infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. Some argue that rational choice 
critiques of federal regulation are cover for attacks on regulation generally. See, e.g., Carol M. 
Browner, Partners in Protecting the Public, WASH. POST, May 30, 1994, at A15 (contending that 
critics of “federal-state partnership[s]” seek to “undermine federal protection of public health and 
natural resources”); see also Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147, at 935. 
149 Joshua Sarnoff, for example, attacks the rational-choice approach directly by arguing that 
local decisions that fail to account for the preferences of out-of-state citizens will not be welfare-
maximizing decisions. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National 
Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 244 (1996) 
(“When states refuse to provide political recognition to the interests of out-of-state citizens . . . 
they may reduce social welfare by preventing reciprocal bargaining to establish ‘efficient’ prices for 
legal entitlements.”). Sarnoff has argued that when Congress acts to address a problem the costs 
and benefits of which are felt locally, its action is legitimate because it reflects the preferences of 
out-of-state voters who care about the problem. Id. at 243-48. This argument makes the boundaries of 
federal power coterminous with the boundaries of the proper exercise of federal power. One 
rejoinder to this view is offered by environmental economists, who have found that people who 
may never use or visit an environmental resource tend to overstate the true value they attach to its 
existence because expressing a preference is costless. This is a kind of moral hazard problem that is 
endemic to attempts at valuing environmental resources using stated measures of “existence 
value.” See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 595 
n.73 (1996) (“[W]ithout a ‘willingness to pay’ mechanism to check the reality and depth of such 
harms, there exists a moral hazard problem of potentially significant proportions because those 
claiming [psychological] injury have little reason to report accurately on their welfare losses and 
much reason to exaggerate.”). Sarnoff also argues that environmental regulation aimed at 
protecting basic rights renders the rational-choice analysis irrelevant, noting that “if federal 
regulation codifies moral rights, the argument that federal regulation reduces social welfare may 
simply be irrelevant.” Sarnoff, supra, at 232-33. This view is a descendant of earlier morality-based 
views of environmental protection, such as that espoused by the ecologist Aldo Leopold. See 
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This analysis begins with four traditional rationales used to justify federal 
regulation of externalities150 and proceeds on the assumption that federal 
regulation is appropriate when one or more of those rationales applies.151 
Consistent with the public economics literature on federalism, the first 
rationale for federal regulation focuses on the geographical scope of the 
externalities in question and argues for regulation at the lowest level of 
government that geographically encompasses the costs and benefits of the 
regulated activity.152 Thus, for example, federal regulation of air pollution 
under the Clean Air Act is justified, in part, by the fact that air pollution 
routinely spills over state boundaries.153 Provisions in the statute authorizing 
downwind states to petition the EPA to regulate upwind emissions, for 
 
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 165-77 (1960) (rejecting the view of nature as an 
economic good rather than an aesthetic one); see also Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
Environmental, Safety and Health Regulation: Ethical and Philosophical Considerations, in COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS 
137, 138-43 (Daniel Swartzman et al. eds., 1982) (questioning whether a cost-beneficial policy is 
necessarily the right policy); Steven Kelman, Economists and the Environmental Muddle, PUB. INT., 
Summer 1981, at 106, 109 (surveying individuals involved in environmental policy in Washington, 
D.C., and finding that few cite efficiency as an argument for pollution-charging policies); 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of Federal 
Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 255-58 (1993) (emphasizing that 
environmental criminal law conceives of environmental regulation as establishing moral obliga-
tions, as opposed to merely economic or administrative obligations). Finally, some advocate a 
“dynamic federalism” in which regulatory responses are multi-layered and adaptive to changing 
circumstances. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case 
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); Hari M. 
Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 55), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138127 (arguing that dynamic federalism 
can account for situations in which regulatory capture is a risk). 
150 We typically justify national government regulation (as opposed to state government 
regulation) using one or more of these rationales. Rationales for federal regulation are to be 
distinguished from rationales for regulation generally. Rationales for regulation, such as the need 
to force firms to internalize externalities and the need to protect consumers in the presence of 
information asymmetries, do not necessarily militate in favor of federal government regulation, if 
state regulation will suffice. 
151 This list of four rationales is adapted from PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 246-47 (1994); and William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, 
The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 
1363-64 (1994).  
152 See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, Thinking About Environmental Federalism, RESOURCES, Winter 
1998, at 14, 14 (“The central idea emerging from the literature in public economics is that the 
responsibility for providing a particular public service should be assigned to the smallest 
jurisdiction whose geographical scope encompasses the relevant benefits and costs associated with 
the provision of the service.”). 
153 See, e.g., MENELL & STEWART, supra note 151, at 246 (“One possible justification [for 
national regulation] is the existence of substantial environmental spillovers from one state to 
another.”) 
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example, are evidence of that rationale.154 Conversely, where the effects of the 
to-be-regulated activity are entirely or primarily local, we might expect state 
or local government to be best equipped to balance those costs and benefits.155  
A second rationale (or set of rationales) for federal regulation focuses on 
the ability or willingness of state governments to regulate. Even when 
externalities fall primarily on local governments, they may not be prepared 
to handle the job. These local governments may lack the ability to regulate 
effectively, due to a lack of resources or scientific competency.156 Detecting 
the presence of this problem is difficult, however, because the absence of 
regulation may signify either (1) an inability to regulate despite the desire 
to do so or (2) the lack of any desire to do so. Thus, it might be presumptu-
ous to assume the desire to regulate in the absence of regulation. On the 
other hand, the so-called “race to the bottom” hypothesis suggests that 
states may under regulate because they must compete with one another for 
jobs and economic development by reducing environmental or other regula-
tory requirements.157 This race-to-the-bottom argument is often framed as a 
 
154 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2006) (providing that “[a]ny State or political subdivision may 
petition the Administrator for a finding that any major source or group of stationary sources emits 
or would emit” pollution in violation of certain federal laws). Indeed, the Clean Air Act’s acid rain 
program (added to the statute by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 
104 Stat. 2468) and its embattled program for regulating transport of nitrogen oxides in the 
eastern United States address this spillover problem directly. See id. § 7651 (“The Congress finds 
that . . . the problem of acid deposition is of national and international significance . . . .”). 
155 For a good discussion of the argument for decentralizing environmental regulation, as 
well as a discussion of “worthy” environmental policy innovations pioneered by the states, see 
Barry G. Rabe, Power to the States: the Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY IN THE 1990s 31, 34-46 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed. 1997). 
156 See, e.g., GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 
1990 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 24-25 (2d ed. 1995) (“[S]tate legislatures may fail to delegate 
sufficient authority to regulatory bodies for them to effectively implement environmental laws and 
may fail to provide adequate staffing of state regulatory agencies.”); see also Paul R. Portney, Air 
Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 27-31 (Paul R. Portney 
ed., 1990) (detailing the failure of state focused efforts to control air pollution prior to the passage 
of the Clean Air Act of 1970). But see Rabe, supra note 155, at 32-34 (explaining the expanded state 
capacity for and state commitment to environmental policy over the first twenty years after Earth 
Day). 
157 See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To 
the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 315-67 (1997) (marshaling empirical evidence to support the 
race-to-the-bottom theory); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) 
(arguing that the mobility of industry poses a risk for “any individual state or community [that 
decides] unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards,” and communities may reasonably 
“fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to 
other areas with lower standards”); see also MENELL & STEWART, supra note 151, at 246 (“[S]tates 
might seek to attract industry by adopting less stringent and therefore less costly environmental 
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kind of prisoners’ dilemma158 in which local governments collectively would 
prefer more stringent regulatory standards, but cannot sustain any coopera-
tive effort to maintain those standards in the face of temptation—namely, 
the opportunity to attract businesses and jobs by lowering regulatory 
standards. Not everyone accepts the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis,159 and it 
has sparked interesting literature examining the logical and normative 
implications of state and local decisions to reduce environmental standards 
in order to promote development.160  
A third rationale for federal regulation applies to the manufacture of 
products that produce externalities and emphasizes the need for uniform 
standards in certain circumstances. Proponents of federal regulation argue 
that it is inefficient and unfair to subject manufacturers to fifty different sets 
of standards, one for each state. Instead, proponents argue that it would be 
far more efficient to establish a single federal standard,161 which suggests a 
need to preempt state regulation of manufacturing standards in particular. 
Thus, for example, the Clean Air Act regulates the emission of pollutants 
from automobiles so that automobile manufacturers need not comply with 
 
regulation,” such that federal regulation “might be justified in order to secure for states the 
environmental quality that they prefer.”). 
158 See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 151, at 246; see also Johnston, supra note 146, at 498-
530 (arguing that as natural resources grow increasingly scarce, locals capture the benefit of 
development but externalize many of the costs, providing an incentive for overdevelopment and 
justifying centralized federal regulation). 
159 Perhaps the most prominent critic is Richard Revesz, who argues that states may relax 
environmental standards not because they are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma, but rather because 
they are making a conscious choice to balance economic development against environmental 
protection. In other words, some states may place a higher value on the underlying polluting 
activity than others, and that choice ought to be respected. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating 
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1233-44 (1992); see also DAVID SCHOENBROD, TIME FOR THE 
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ARISTOCRACY TO GIVE UP 5-6 (1998) (echoing Revesz); Henry N. 
Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating 
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 31 (1996) (same).  
160 There also exist robust criticisms of Revesz’s arguments. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 149, 
at 278-85, 318 (arguing that “it defies credulity to believe [states] will achieve the goals on their 
own” given states’ inability to achieve environmental goals both before and after the passage of 
major federal environmental laws); see also Engel, supra note 157, at 315-57, 375 (using industry 
location studies and empirical observation to conclude that “the preponderance of the evidence 
indicates that states engaged in interstate competition for industry are also engaged in a race-to-
the-bottom in environmental standard-setting”). But see Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom 
and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 546-63 (1997) 
(reasserting his claim that state competition in a market for mobile investment can be welfare-
enhancing). For a middle ground, see Esty, supra note 149, at 648-52. 
161 See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 151, at 247 (“[L]egitimate but conflicting state prod-
uct requirements could create a regulatory crazy-quilt.”). 
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fifty different state standards.162 Similarly, the U.S. Department of Energy 
administers federal standards regulating the energy efficiency of appliances.163  
A fourth rationale for federal regulation emphasizes an important  
national interest in the regulated activity and the need to control or stimu-
late its development through federal regulation, irrespective of the geo-
graphic distribution of costs and benefits. For example, the Federal Power 
Act of 1935 sought to promote and regulate hydroelectric development as 
part of the New Deal.164 Likewise, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 sought to 
promote and regulate the development (both peaceful and military) of 
nuclear energy.165 In these two examples, Congress declared the promotion 
and close regulation of these industries to be in the national interest, and 
granted broad licensing and regulatory powers to federal agencies (FERC 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), respectively).  
These four rationales for federal regulation—to address pollution spill-
over issues, to prevent a race to the bottom, to address a need for uniform 
standards, and to promote the national interest—are the most persuasive 
logical arguments for federal action. Of course, regulation is a political 
process, and any normative analysis of regulatory federalism should not 
ignore the interest group politics of regulation.166  
2.  Political Rationales for Federal Regulation 
Within the political science literature, traditional interest group–
pluralism explanations of policymaking portray groups as representatives of 
 
162 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006). 
163 See id. § 6312.  
164 See Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 842 (directing the Federal Power Commission (now 
FERC) to issue hydroelectric licenses on the condition that the applicant’s plan is “best adapted to 
develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water resources of the region”) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1)). 
165 See Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 1(a), 68 Stat. 919, 921 (“It is therefore declared to be the policy 
of the United States that . . . the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be 
directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare . . . .”) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a)). 
166 That is, interest group pluralism treats the policy process as a tug of war between orga-
nized groups. Because groups undertake direct lobbying on behalf of their members, only those 
interests represented by groups will be heard (or at least, influential) in the policy process. Interest 
group pluralism was the dominant theory of American policymaking in political science in the 
1950s and ’60s. For a relatively recent summary and literature review, see generally G. DAVID 
GARSON, GROUP THEORIES OF POLITICS (1978). See also JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING 
INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 19-55 
(1991) (exploring the dynamics of interest group formation and pressure). 
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broader societal interests. Public choice explanations,167 by contrast, reject 
the notion that group pressure represents broader social preferences accu-
rately, instead emphasizing the ways in which powerful groups can control 
the policy process.168 One variant of this argument emphasizes the advantages 
business interests have in organizing and pressuring political actors.169 
Because businesses have more at stake and face fewer transaction-cost 
impediments to organizing, they find it easier to form pressure groups 
(compared to broader mass interests, many of whose potential members 
either do not find it worth their while to contribute to the formation of  
groups or are content to free ride on the efforts of others).170 Another 
public-choice idea, capture theory, articulates ways in which business 
interests can capture the regulatory process (and regulatory agencies) for 
their own benefit to erect barriers to entry, capture rents, and otherwise 
pursue their own interests.171 Capture theory has both an insidious version 
 
167 Here, I use the term “public choice” to describe work that both (1) draws on the method-
ology and perspective of economics to study political and policy phenomena and (2) ascribes 
selfish, “rent seeking” motives to actors in the policy process. That is not necessarily the only 
definition of “public choice,” and as I have argued elsewhere, legal scholarship has conflated 
rational choice methods with normative skepticism about the ability of politics and policy to 
produce decisions that represent majority preferences. See, e.g., David B. Spence, A Public Choice 
Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 413-18 (2002) (exploring the distinction 
between these two ideas, and the effect of these literatures on administrative law scholarship).  
168 Certain strains of public-choice scholarship also deny the existence of any measurable 
“public interest.” Arrow’s Theorem, and the literature it spawned, debated this question. See 
generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). Specifically, 
Arrow’s Theorem demonstrated the logical impossibility of devising collective choice mechanisms 
capable of satisfying simultaneously several desirable characteristics commonly thought to be 
essential attributes of democracy. Id. at 22-33. Arrow’s Theorem produced an enormous scholarly 
reaction, including a great deal of work attempting to demonstrate ways in which constitutions 
and legislatures modify some of Arrow’s conditions to make meaningful social choice possible. For 
a summary of that scholarship, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A 
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE 65-113 (1982). However, one need not take sides on this issue to address the question of 
whether federal or state regulation is more desirable in any given instance. 
169 For the leading work on this topic, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTIVE: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).  
170 Olson’s argument is essentially that for mass interests, the decision whether to join a 
group is represented by the prisoner’s dilemma game. For an in-depth treatment of the game-
theory aspects of this group-formation problem, see TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 5-6, 19-20 (1992). 
171 Capture theory predates public choice scholarship. For some non–public choice versions 
of capture theory, analyzing how businesses use their resource advantages to influence, see 
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS 5 (1977). See also THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY 
AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 68-85 (1969) (discussing the rise of “interest-group 
liberalism”). The canon of the capture theory literature includes WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., 
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 29-30 (1971). See also Sam Peltzman, 
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and an innocent version. According to the insidious version, industry uses 
its money and other political resources to control regulatory agencies 
through their congressional overseers (particularly congressional commit-
tees).172 According to the innocent version, regulatory agencies gradually 
adopt the point of view of the industries they regulate as a consequence of 
repeated interactions with those industries.173 However, there is a rejoinder 
to capture theory as well. “Republican moments” refer to situations in 
which intense public interest in a particular social problem leads politicians 
to organize mass interests for their own political gain. In this way, politi-
cians represent these mass interests in the policy process despite their 
disadvantages, enabling these interests to overcome the advantages busi-
nesses otherwise have in influencing policy decisions.174  
 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 217 (1976) (portraying regulation 
as a private rent-seeking activity); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 5 (1971) (theorizing regulation as an instrument that industries use to 
their own economic advantage); cf. Sarnoff, supra note 149, at 240 n.54 (“It should . . . be obvious: 
(1) that the ability to spend wealth to influence policy does not provide an objective measure of 
value; and (2) that policies adopted in response to campaign contributions do not necessarily 
increase social welfare.” (emphasis in original)). 
172 See, e.g., DOUGLAS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON 26-48 (1964) (arguing that Con-
gress’s military-industry alliance created a powerful subgovernment, which could lead to 
consequences in the organization of political power); JOHN LEIPER FREEMAN, THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS: EXECUTIVE BUREAU-LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE RELATIONS 27 (rev. ed. 1965) 
(noting that interest groups “do not usually seek to control the whole machinery of policy-making, 
but rather to prevent policies . . . which would injure their special interests and to secure other 
policies favorable to their interests”); Thomas L. Gais et al., Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and 
Representative Institutions, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA, supra note 166, at 125-
39 (investigating the “programmatic goals of different types of groups [in the 1970s and ’80s], the 
implications of their contrasting strategies for seeking to influence the government in pursuit of 
their goals”); Stigler, supra note 171, at 3 (positing that “regulation is acquired by the industry and 
is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”). 
173 See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COM-
MISSION 169 (1955) (“On the whole, commissions have not acted in an unfair or arbitrary manner 
toward private parties. Charges of bias tend to reflect not unsatisfactory procedures or arbitrary 
action by commissions but rather the opposition of regulated groups to regulatory policy.”); 
GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877–1916, at 3-6 (1965); John A. Ferejohn, The 
Structure of Agency Decision Processes, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 441, 442-45 
(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987) (illustrating the struggle between case-by-
case adjudication and more openness in the agencies’ decisionmaking choices); see also David B. 
Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 413, 417-18 n.19 (1999) (summarizing the literature of agency capture). 
174 The idea of “republican moments” comes from James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: 
The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1990). 
For an adaptation of the theory of “republican moments” to the context of environmental politics, 
explaining how environmental regulation can be enacted in the face of free-rider problems, see 
Anthony Downs, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 68 (1992). 
See also Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology—The “Issue-Attention Cycle”, 28 PUB. INT., 
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What do these political explanations have to do with federalism? Perhaps 
advocates of the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal regulation fear that 
the likelihood of capture is greater at the state level than at the federal level. 
There is a plausible argument to that effect. If so-called “republican mo-
ments” can overcome pro-business biases in the policy process, and if the 
probability of a republican moment is a function of the amount of public 
attention devoted to a particular policy decision, then capture should be 
more prevalent at the state level, where there tends to be less policy trans-
parency and where the policy process tends to attract less press attention.175 
Table 3 below summarizes these rationales for federal (rather than state or 
local) regulation. 
 
Table 3: Rationales for Federal Regulation 
 
Logical (Nonpolitical) Rationales Political Rationales 
Managing spillover effects when 
externalities cross state lines 
State governments possibly more 
susceptible to capture by industry 
than the federal government 
Lack of state willingness to regulate/ 
Race to the bottom 
Need for uniform national standards 
Important national interest at stake 
 
B. Federalism and Energy Facilities, Generally 
Most federal energy-permitting and regulatory regimes are justified by 
some combination of the first, second, and fourth logical rationales described 
 
Summer 1972, at 38 (describing the process leading up to a republican moment, and explaining 
what kinds of policy issues are most likely to experience such a moment). For a discussion of 
republican moments in the history of environmental law, see Spence, supra note 167, at 435-36. 
175 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer 
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1013 n.44 (arguing that state 
decisionmaking is particularly likely to diverge from majority preferences because of collective 
action problems); Warren L. Ratliff, The De-Evolution of Environmental Organization, 17 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 45, 51-73 (1997) (discussing the difficulties of starting environmental 
groups at the state level, as opposed to the national level); Stewart, supra note 157, at 1213 (arguing 
that federal agencies are less susceptible to capture than are local and state agencies); Matthew D. 
Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 131-41 (2002) (arguing that citizen involvement is crucial to policing the 
relationship between regulators and industry). But see Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the 
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 123 (2011) 
(finding evidence of industry’s disproportionate participation in EPA rulemakings). 
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in the previous Section, though many of these regimes apply to a variety of 
industries, of which energy is just one. Some energy facilities are subject to 
a variety of risk-based regulations that focus not on a particular industry, 
but on controlling interstate/spillover externalities, like air or water pollu-
tion, or preventing a race to the bottom across a variety of industries 
(including energy). These types of regulatory regimes are the product of 
republican moments, driven by public concern over the risks at issue.176 
Coal-fired power plants and oil refineries, for example, are subject to risk-
based regulation by a variety of federal agencies under several federal 
statutes, each focused on managing a particular set of environmental, health, 
and safety risks. Thus, new or modified coal-fired power plants and oil 
refineries must obtain air and water discharge permits under the Clean Air 
Act177 and Clean Water Act,178 respectively.179 Because air and surface-water 
pollution cross state boundaries,180 federal regulation makes sense; similarly, 
federal regulators have stopped short of regulating entirely intrastate water 
pollution for the most part.181 At the same time, coal-fired power plants must 
comply with OSHA worker-protection regulations182 and hazardous waste 
 
176 See Spence, supra note 167, at 436 (arguing that groundswells of public concern, organized 
by “political entrepreneurs” in Congress, produced these laws). 
177 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7602(J), 7661a (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2012) (stating the basic permit 
provisions of the Clean Air Act). 
178 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (stating the basic permit provisions of the Clean Water Act). 
179 Some commentators argue that only a minority of Clean Air Act provisions are aimed at 
interstate pollution problems. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 159, at 1224-25 (“The Clean Air Act 
contains several provisions directed primarily at interstate externalities . . . . By far the bulk of [its] 
provisions . . . however, are wholly unrelated to the control of interstate externalities.”). However, 
this conclusion is too narrowly focused on statutory provisions expressly addressing interstate 
externalities. In fact, the entire regulatory scheme is built on the premise that air pollution mixes 
freely in the ambient air, and that emissions in one location will affect the ability of downwind 
locations to comply with clean air standards. 
180 Of course, carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions present a global problem 
because they exacerbate global warming. Long-regulated conventional pollutants, such as sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter, present similar environmental problems because 
they can also travel great distances. The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
recognize that pollutants mix freely in the ambient air irrespective of state boundaries, as do its 
provisions regarding interstate transport. For a description of the operation of section 126 of the 
CAA, governing interstate pollution problems, as well as various cross-state pollution programs, 
see supra note 154.  
181 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 171-73 (2001) (discussing the limitation of Clean Water Act jurisdiction to navigable waters 
and associated wetlands); Cory Brader, Comment, Toward a Constitutional Chevron: Lessons from 
Rapanos, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1489-92 (2012) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
interpretations of the “waters of the United States” language found in the CWA). 
182 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (vesting OSHA with the power to protect employees from 
hazardous work environments). 
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management requirements under RCRA183 that may involve relatively few 
interstate impacts, but which might be justified on race-to-the-bottom 
grounds. That is, in the absence of federal regulation of these risks, one 
might imagine states competing for mobile capital investment (and resulting 
jobs and economic development) by lowering their regulatory standards.184  
Many of these risk-based regulatory regimes address federalism issues 
head-on by employing a system of “cooperative federalism,”185 under which 
federal agencies establish national standards186 and permitting requirements, 
but delegate to the states the authority to administer regulatory programs,187 
including the authority to issue or deny permits.188 This structure may reserve 
for the states the authority to impose more stringent requirements than 
those found in the federal standards; in those cases, the federal standards act 
 
183 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939 (defining federal standards for disposal of solid and hazardous 
waste). 
184 Some contend that the race-to-the-bottom argument is weak because the relative strin-
gency of state environmental regulatory standards may play a small role in firm location decisions. 
See Revesz, supra note 159, at 1235. 
185 See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 179, 180 (2005) (defining “cooperative federalism” as “an arrangement under which a 
national government induces coordination from subordinate jurisdictions”); Robert L. Fischman 
& Angela M. King, Savings Clauses and Trends in Natural Resources Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 131-41 (2007) (providing the National Elk Refuge as an example of 
cooperative federalism between a state (in this case, Wyoming) and the federal government). 
186 Some commentators justify this kind of cooperative federalism approach as essential to 
promoting a national interest in minimum standards, while offering states some flexibility on the 
implementation of those standards. Cf. Sarnoff, supra note 149, at 261-66 (discussing both the 
flexibility and some of the costs inherent in the regulatory apparatuses that often follow from 
cooperative federalism).  
187 The CAA and CWA each provide that the EPA may delegate enforcement administra-
tion functions to the states. The RCRA is similarly structured. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 315 F.3d 
1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (describing the “division of labor” between states and the EPA as 
“inherent in the regime of cooperative federalism created by the CAA”); Michigan v. EPA, 268 
F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing the CAA as “an experiment in cooperative federal-
ism”); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing the CAA’s 
focus on federal and state cooperation and planning). The OSH Act authorizes OSHA to delegate 
authority to administer the regulatory program to so-called “plan states”—states whose safety and 
health regulatory regimes meet OSHA specifications according to the approved state regulatory 
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 667. 
188 The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) tracks the EPA’s delegation of permit-
ting authority under several major environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act. For a summary of this data, see Delegation By Environmental Act, ENVTL. 
COUNCIL STATES, http://www.ecos.org/section/states/enviro_actlist (last updated Nov. 2010). 
The EPA has clashed with states over how to enforce regulatory standards. See David B. Spence, 
The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental 
Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 938-39 (2001) (describing the EPA’s conflict with the Missouri 
Department of Natural Resources in the 1980s). 
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as a regulatory minimum to which states can choose to add.189 Some of these 
risk-regulation regimes limit regulators’ ability to balance environmental, 
health, and safety concerns against economic or energy security concerns. 
For example, OSHA and EPA regulators may not consider costs when 
establishing air pollution standards for the ambient air or for workplaces, 
respectively.190 Thus, for coal-fired power plants and oil refineries, no single 
regulator is charged with comprehensively examining the environmental, 
health, and safety risks associated with a facility. Moreover, federal regula-
tory responsibility for these facilities is diffuse in that each regulator focuses 
on only one aspect of an energy facility’s operations, such as workplace 
safety or air emissions.191  
Other energy facilities are subject to regulations focused not on specific 
risks but on the energy industry itself. For these facilities, Congress has 
decided that it is in the national interest to center most environmental, 
health, and safety reviews in unified federal licensing processes adminis-
tered by lead federal agencies. Often, this allocation of power is the product 
of a congressional decision that the national interest requires development 
of a particular kind of energy. Examples of this kind of approach include 
the licensing processes for hydroelectric facilities under the Federal Power 
Act, 192  nuclear power plants under the Atomic Energy Act, 193  liquefied 
 
189 For example, the RCRA savings clause reads, in pertinent part: “[N]o state or political 
subdivision may impose any requirements less stringent than those authorized under this 
subchapter . . . . Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any state or political 
subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements . . . which are more stringent than those 
imposed by such regulations.” 42 U.S.C. § 6929.  
190 The leading decision affirming this principle in the context of the EPA’s establishment of 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the CAA is Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001). See also Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“[T]he [CAA] and its legislative history made clear that economic considerations play no part in 
the promulgation of ambient air quality standards . . . .”). For the leading decision affirming a 
slightly modified version of this principle in OSHA workplace standards, which notes that the 
OSH Act “intended to require the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of harm,” see 
Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 641 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  
191 William Buzbee has called this the “regulatory commons” problem, likening diffuse regu-
latory responsibility to the problem of managing a public good over which no one has ownership 
rights. Buzbee argues that, in the regulatory commons, no one has an incentive to balance overall 
costs and benefits, creating regulatory “free-riding” that mirrors the kind of free riding that 
economists have associated with the management of public goods. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing 
the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7-14 (2003). For a game-
theoretic treatment of the public goods management problem and free riding generally, see 
SANDLER, supra note 170, at 13-18. 
192 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–828c. 
193 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h-13. 
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natural gas terminals under both the Natural Gas Act194 and the Deepwater 
Ports Act,195 surface mining of coal under the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act (SMCRA),196 and offshore oil and gas production under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).197 Under these types of 
regimes, Congress tends to grant the federal licensing agency wide latitude 
to balance economic and energy security concerns against environmental, 
health, and safety risks. For example, the Atomic Energy Act authorized the 
NRC (formerly known as the Atomic Energy Commission) to grant or 
deny licenses for nuclear power plants in accordance with such procedures 
and “subject to such conditions as . . . [it] may by rule or regulation 
establish.” 198  Similarly, the Natural Gas Act authorizes the FERC to 
approve onshore LNG facilities “upon such terms and conditions as the 
Commission may find necessary or appropriate . . . .”199 Compared to 
risk-based regulatory regimes, it is more common for comprehensive federal 
licensing regimes to preempt state and local regulation under the Suprema-
cy Clause.200 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has determined that 
the Federal Power Act preempts most state and local regulation of hydro-
electric power facilities under the Supremacy Clause.201 Likewise, the Atomic 
 
194 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1). 
195 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1503.  
196 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1202(f), 1211 (including among the purposes of SMCRA the need to 
assure adequate supply of coal and to balance this interest against environmental and other 
interests). Absent this purpose, it would be difficult to reconcile SMCRA with the other rationales 
for federal action described here, since most of the effects of surface mining are felt locally 
(discharges to navigable waters being one possible exception), and the need to mine coal where 
one finds it makes the race-to-the-bottom rationale a poor fit. But cf. Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981) (explaining that, without federal regulation, 
interstate competition to attract coal-industry investment would create a race to the bottom, 
encouraging states to loosen their environmental standards). 
197 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a. 
198 42 U.S.C. § 2133(a). 
199 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a). 
200 The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause states simply that federal law shall be “the su-
preme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Under modern Supremacy Clause jurispru-
dence, federal regulation may preempt state regulation explicitly, in the statute, or implicitly, 
when state and federal regulation conflict or when courts decide that federal regulation is sufficiently 
comprehensive that it “occupies the field,” leaving no room for supplemental state regulation. 
These principles are outlined in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984), and 
English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). For a summary of the modern case law, 
see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 774-77 (1994). 
201 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 506 (1990) (holding that the Federal Power Act 
preempts California minimum stream flow requirements because they would interfere with 
FERC’s comprehensive authority); First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 
U.S. 152, 181-82 (1946) (declaring that a federal licensee was not required to comply with Iowa 
permitting requirements for new dam construction because the federal regulatory scheme “leave[s] 
no room or need for conflicting state controls”).  
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Energy Act impliedly preempts state and local regulation of radiation 
hazards,202 and the Natural Gas Act expressly preempts local law when it 
comes to siting natural gas facilities, including LNG terminals.203  
However, while comprehensive licensing statutes grant wide latitude to 
federal regulatory agencies, and often preempt local law, this does not mean 
that states have no influence in these licensing processes. In fact, most 
comprehensive federal licensing statutes require a federal licensing agency 
to consider state concerns in the licensing process. This is true of the 
offshore oil and gas leasing process under the OCSLA,204 the nuclear power 
plant–licensing process under the Atomic Energy Act,205 and the hydroelec-
tric licensing process under the Federal Power Act.206 Moreover, states can 
often exert independent leverage in the licensing process through authority 
delegated to the state under other federal laws. For example, the CWA 
requires that federally approved projects that “may result in any discharge 
into . . . navigable waters” secure a certification from the applicable state 
that the discharge will comply with the Act’s water quality–protection 
requirements.207 Many energy facilities are subject to this provision.208 
 
202 See N. States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that states 
may not enact stricter radiation emissions regulations than the federal standards), aff’d mem., 405 
U.S. 1035 (1972); United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(concluding that a city ordinance requiring an additional license for nuclear reactors was preempted 
by the Atomic Energy Act); State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 337, 344 (N.J. 
1976) (declaring that New Jersey’s environmental protection agency’s enforcement of state pollution 
laws against a nuclear power plant was preempted by federal regulation). But cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv’n & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 213-16 (1983) (upholding a 
California statute regulating waste storage because it was “economic”—not siting—legislation, and 
therefore was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act). 
203 See, e.g., Weavers Cove Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 
475 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that the Natural Gas Act’s grant of “exclusive authority” to FERC over 
siting LNG facilities preempts local siting laws).  
204 See 43 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (requiring the Department of the Interior to consult with other 
governmental bodies, including state governors, in making leasing decisions under the OCSLA). 
205 See 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 (2012) (requiring the NRC to consider state emergency-response 
planning during the licensing process for a nuclear reactor). 
206 See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2)(B) (requiring FERC to consider recommendations from other 
federal and state resource agencies in making its licensing decisions); 18 C.F.R. § 5.1(d) (requiring 
license applicants to consult with state, as well as federal and interstate, agencies before filing 
hydroelectric facility–licensing applications). 
207 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(4). The term “navigable waters” attained a specific meaning under 
the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence before Congress used it in the Clean Water 
Act. It had come to mean surface waters which were navigable “either in their natural or improved 
condition.” United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute, Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(1972), as recognized in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  
208 See e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 715 (1994) (authorizing a 
state agency to impose so-called minimum-flow requirements as a condition to granting certification 
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Similarly, if a proposed energy project may affect the coastal zone of a state 
with an approved coastal zone management plan under the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA), the federal agency with jurisdiction must make 
a determination that the proposed project is consistent with the state’s 
coastal zone management plan before moving forward.209 This kind of 
leverage through federal law is limited, however. When federal law grants 
states real leverage over an energy project, that authority is usually narrow. 
For example, states cannot use their authority to issue or deny certification 
under the CWA to oppose a hydroelectric project based on aesthetic or 
neighborhood character issues, because the certification process is limited to 
protecting water quality.210 Similarly, the CZMA does not give the final 
word to the states whose coastal zone is affected. In the event a state 
disagrees with a federal agency’s determination of a proposed energy project’s 
consistency with the state’s coastal zone management plan, the final deci-
sion rests not with the state but with the Secretary of Commerce.211  
Table 4 below summarizes the kinds of federal licensing and permitting 
regimes that apply to various types of energy facilities and the routes of 
state or local influence over the approval process for each facility. As that 
summary indicates, some types of energy facilities must overcome more 
regulatory barriers than others. Nonetheless, most energy facilities are 
subject to a wide variety of regulatory regimes designed to regulate envi-
ronmental, health, and safety risks. All of those regimes can be explained 
using some combination of the four rationales for federal regulation de-
scribed in Section III.A.  
 
to a hydroelectric facility). Recently, the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation denied such certification to Entergy Corporation, which was seeking the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s relicensing of its Indian Point nuclear power plant. See Press Release, 
Riverkeeper, Riverkeeper Hails New York’s Decision to Deny Critical Water Quality Certificate 
for Indian Point (Apr. 3, 2010), available at http://www.riverkeeper.org/news-events/news/stop-
polluters/power-plant-cases/riverkeeper-hails-new-yorks-decision-to-deny-critical-water-quality-
certificate-for-indian-point.  
209  See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (requiring “[e]ach federal agency activity . . . that 
affects . . . the coastal zone [to] be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum 
extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs”); Sec’y 
of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 321-30 (1984) (discussing whether the CZMA consistency 
requirement applied to offshore oil and gas leasing in light of the Act’s legislative history, which 
indicated a concern for potential damage to state coastal zones), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1), as recognized in California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Erica Schroeder, Comment, Turning Offshore Wind On, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1631, 1663 (2010) 
(discussing a potential role for the states in the author’s proposed amendment of the CZMA to 
promote offshore wind development). 
210 See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 711. 
211  See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (setting forth the CZMA process for approving federal pro-
grams even when they are inconsistent with state programs, without consent from state agencies). 
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Table 4: Selected Energy Facility Siting/Regulatory Regimes 
 
Energy 
Facility Siting 
Comprehensive 
Federal Licensing 
Program?
State 
Regulation 
Other Federal 
Regulation 
Nuclear Power 
Plants 
Atomic Energy 
Act/NRC 
Preempted by 
federal regulation 
National 
Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA)212  
Endangered Species  
Act (ESA)213 
CWA § 401 Cert. 
Hydroelectric 
Plants FPA/FERC 
Preempted by 
federal regulation 
NEPA
ESA 
CWA § 401 Cert. 
Fossil Fueled 
Electric Power 
Plants 
No 
Licensing regimes 
in some states (e.g., 
California)214 
Add-on pollution 
regulation215
NEPA 
CAA 
CWA Nat’l Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES)  
 
212 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The NEPA requires the preparation of an environ-
mental impact statement for any “major Federal action [including the issuance of permits] 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).  
213 The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is located at 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544. For the ESA’s 
firm prohibition on federal agencies from taking any actions, including the issuance of permits, 
that may “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species,” see id. § 1536(a)(2). The 
ESA is also notable for prohibiting anyone subjected to the jurisdiction of the United States from 
“tak[ing]” or harming endangered species. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
214 See, e.g., 26 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 1724.6 (2012) (noting that approval must be  
obtained from the California Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources before any subsurface 
injection or disposal can begin, and requiring that an operator must provide the pertinent and 
necessary data for the evaluation of the proposed project). Another California conservation 
regulation stipulates the filing, notification, operating and testing requirements for underground 
injection wells and projects. In particular, it states that “[n]otices of intention to drill, redrill, or 
rework, on current Division forms, shall be completed and submitted to the division for approval 
whenever a new well is to be drilled for use as an injection well.” Id. § 1724.10(b). 
215 State regulatory requirements vary. For instance, in Texas, section 3.9 of the Standards 
for Management of Hazardous Oil and Gas Waste governs the permitting, operating, monitoring, 
and testing of disposal by injection into a porous formation not productive of oil, gas, or 
geothermal resources. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.9(3) (2012). All applications, including those 
with respect to commercial disposal wells, require permits from the Railroad Commission of 
Texas. Section 3.98 governs nonexempt, hazardous oil and gas waste. Id. § 3.98. Oil and gas waste 
that is not uniquely associated with exploration and production primary field operations, and 
hence nonexempt from regulation as hazardous waste under section 3.98(2) of the Texas rules, as 
well as 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b), requires a hazardous-waste determination. If determined hazardous, 
the oil and gas waste is then subject to section 3.98.  
California has adopted a much narrower exploration and production waste exemption than at 
the federal level. The exemption applies in California if the waste displays the toxicity characteristic 
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Energy 
Facility Siting 
(cont’d) 
Federal Licensing 
Program? 
(cont’d)
State  
Regulation 
(cont’d)
Other Federal 
Regulation 
(cont’d) 
Wind and Solar 
Farms 
No (Department of 
Interior (DOI) 
approval under Outer 
Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (OCSLA) 
for offshore wind 
only) 
Licensing regimes 
in some states (e.g., 
California ) 
Local zoning 
requirements 
ESA 
NEPA (if federal 
approval required) 
 
Electric 
Transmission 
Lines 
FPA/FERC 
State approval 
required 
ESA 
NEPA 
Onshore Oil 
and Gas Wells 
No 
State conservation 
regulation 
NEPA (if federal 
approval required) 
CWA NPDES 
(wastewater disposal) 
Waste disposal exempt 
from RCRA coverage 
SDWA underground 
injection well–permitting 
(fracking is exempt) 
Offshore Oil 
and Gas Wells 
OCSLA/DOI 
No jurisdiction 
beyond state waters 
CZMA 
NEPA 
ESA 
CWA NPDES  
CWA § 401 Cert. 
  
  
  
 
for hazardous waste based solely on the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). One 
California regulation provides that all discharges into the ocean shall conform to the requirements 
of the appropriate Regional Water Quality Control Board. CAL. REGS. § 1748.1. Another 
regulation states that oil-field wastes shall be disposed of in a manner that does not damage life, 
health, property, freshwater aquifers, surface waters, natural resources, nor menace public safety. 
Id. § 1775(b). Disposal sites shall conform to State Water Resources Control Board and appropri-
ate Regional Board regulations. Id. Section 1775(b) prohibits the dumping of harmful chemicals 
“where subsequent meteoric waters might wash significant quantities into freshwaters” and the 
permanent disposal of drilling mud into open pits. Id. 
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Energy 
Facility Siting 
(cont’d) 
Federal Licensing 
Program? 
(cont’d)
State  
Regulation 
(cont’d)
Other Federal 
Regulation 
(cont’d) 
LNG  
Terminals 
Onshore: Natural Gas 
Act (NGA)/FERC 
Offshore: Deepwater 
Ports Act/Dep’t of 
Transp. 
Onshore:  
preempted by 
federal regulation 
Offshore: no 
jurisdiction beyond 
state waters 
NEPA 
CWA NPDES  
CWA § 401 Cert. 
CZMA 
ESA 
Oil Refineries No 
Add-on pollution 
regulation 
CAA 
CWA NPDES  
CWA § 401 Cert. 
Natural Gas 
Pipelines NGA FERC 
Preempted by 
federal regulation 
NEPA  
ESA 
Coal Mining 
 
Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act 
(surface mining) 
Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Act 
(underground mining) 
States may regulate 
only through a 
federally  
approved plan 
NEPA 
ESA 
CWA § 404 (dredge 
and fill program) 
 
IV. FEDERALISM AND FRACKING 
A careful examination of Table 4 reveals that the federal government 
regulates fracking, like other onshore oil and gas operations, relatively lightly. 
There is no federal licensing requirement for fracking operations and few 
other federal approvals are required as part of a fracking operation. Federal 
regulation may be triggered if the fracking operation risks harm to an 
endangered species,216 will result in a discharge to surface waters217 or a 
 
216 Fracking operations that could “take,” or harm, an endangered species will trigger regula-
tion under section 9 of the ESA, which prohibits actions which “take” endangered species. 16 
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Furthermore, section 7 of the ESA prohibits a federal agency from 
approving any action that could “jeopardize the continued existence” of a listed endangered 
species. Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
217 Fracking operations that will discharge wastewater into nearby surface waters require an 
NPDES permit under section 402 of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342(a)(1) (providing the 
process by which applicants can receive permits from the federal government for the discharge of 
any pollutant or combination of pollutants). 
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pretreatment facility,218 or will result in underground injection of wastewater 
for disposal.219 The transport of hazardous chemicals requires compliance 
with Hazardous Materials Transportation Act’s labeling and manifest re-
quirements.220 However, it is not uncommon for fracking operations to 
avoid regulation under many of these provisions.221 Critically, if the opera-
tion requires no federal approvals, then it will not trigger ancillary federal 
regulations, such as the requirement to obtain certification from the state 
under the CWA222 or undertake an environmental review under the NEPA.223  
On the other hand, fracking is subject to a growing and varied list of 
state regulatory requirements.224 Given the ongoing controversy over the 
sufficiency of existing regulation, is there a case for comprehensive federal 
regulation of fracking operations? Turning once again to the rationales for 
federal regulation developed in Section III.A, we might ask how persuasively 
each rationale applies to the case of fracking, while keeping in mind the 
influence of politics in the regulatory process. The next section will explore 
those questions.225 
A. Spillovers and the Geographic Scope of Fracking Externalities 
Do the environmental, health, and safety externalities of fracking tend 
to cross state lines? If so, that fact might suggest an increased role for 
federal regulation of fracking. There remains considerable uncertainty about 
fracking’s environmental consequences. However, an examination of what 
we know about fracking’s environmental impact suggests that much of that 
impact is local. 
 
218 If a fracking operation’s wastewater is discharged to a municipal sewage treatment plant, 
it will be subject to CWA pretreatment rules. These rules regulate discharges which “upset” the 
operation of the plant or cause pollutants to “[p]ass [t]hrough” to surface waters. See 40 C.F.R.  
§ 403.8(a) (2010). 
219 For a discussion of the SDWA underground-injection-well–permitting program, see supra 
notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
220 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5128. 
221 None of these federal wastewater disposal approvals are required if the wastewater is 
treated and recycled or disposed of on site without underground injection.  
222 See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra Section II.B. 
225 This Section examines the spillover, race-to-the-bottom, and national-interest rationales 
for federal regulation. The fourth rationale, that manufacturers need uniform federal standards, 
seems inapplicable to this case. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
this rationale. However, fugitive methane emissions are an example of a problem that seems 
amenable to a technical solution, perhaps one that involves federal manufacturing standards in the 
gas production, compression, and transmission equipment industries. See infra subsection IV.A.3 
for a discussion of methane emissions as a national concern.  
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1. Water Supply 
Fracking consumes enormous quantities of water, much of which re-
mains in the ground after the completion of the fracking process.226 Wide-
spread fracking operations, then, pose the potential to strain water supplies 
in arid parts of the country. Traditionally, water supply issues227 have been 
a matter of state concern. Federal regulatory jurisdiction over water has 
historically been confined to navigable surface-water bodies and associated 
wetlands.228 For example, federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction under the 
CWA is tied to the navigability of affected surface waters,229 and the 
Federal Power Act expressly reserved to the states the power to control 
water supply issues.230 Indeed, most interstate conflict over the use or 
management of bodies of water on state boundaries has been resolved 
through voluntary compacts between the affected states, though those 
compacts are subject to ratification by Congress.231 On the other hand, most 
water supply conflicts pit local uses or users against one another. Character-
istic disagreements involve farmers seeking irrigation water and homeowners 
seeking drinking water or conflicts between communities using the same 
aquifer. These battles generally do not implicate national interests and 
rarely spill across state lines. Taken together, all of these considerations 
suggest that water supply issues should be treated as a state and local matter. 
On the other hand, many commentators predict that water supply issues 
will become more contentious in the future as growth and the effects of 
climate change strain water supplies, particularly in the Southwest.232 
 
226 See supra Section I.B. 
227 This subsection addresses fracking’s potential impact on adequacy-of-water-supply issues. 
Water-supply issues are distinguishable from concerns about the protection of the quality of 
groundwater or drinking water aquifers. For a discussion of groundwater quality issues, see infra 
subsection IV.A.5. 
228 See supra note 181. 
229 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (maintaining that it is the goal of Congress to use the CWA to 
eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters). 
230 See 16 U.S.C. § 821 (expressing the congressional purpose to leave state laws governing 
water rights undisturbed by the Act). 
231 For the Compact Clause, which reserves this power to Congress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 3. For an insightful discussion of these water management compacts, see Noah D. Hall, 
Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 405, 409-14 (2006). 
232 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 831 (2008) (pointing out that the lack of comprehensive regulation has 
contributed to rivers in the western United States being “sucked dry”); Paul Faeth, U.S Energy 
Security and Water: The Challenges We Face, ENV’T MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 4, 9 (calling water-
supply issues fracking’s “Achilles’ heel”), available at http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/ 
Back%20Issues/2012/January-February%202012/US-Energy-Full.html. 
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Fights over water supplies could lead to increased incidence of interstate 
conflict, which could in turn trigger federal regulation as an adjudicatory 
response to conflict. Indeed, many of the regional compacts that exist today 
were the result of this kind of interstate water dispute233 and some were 
specifically created to resolve cross-border conflict over the use and protec-
tion of the water resource.234 Notably, the significance of water-supply 
issues for fracking varies greatly by region. For example, in the Eagle Ford 
and Barnett Shales of Texas, where drought is a problem, these issues may 
ultimately loom large.235 In contrast, in the Marcellus Shale of New York, 
where water is more plentiful, water supply seems unlikely to constrain 
development.236 Thus, while water-supply concerns may become a national 
issue, the threats to water supply posed by fracking vary considerably 
throughout the country.  
2.  Neighborhood Character Issues 
Neighborhood character impacts are, by definition, local. Nevertheless, 
they are perhaps the most significant consequences of fracking. From the 
beginning of site preparation through the completion of the fracking job,237 
 
233 See George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First 
Century: Is It Time to Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 765-66 (2003) (“There are three 
means by which interstate water conflicts may be resolved: litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
negotiation of interstate compacts, or federal legislation . . . . With great consistency, the 
Supreme Court has advised the states to resolve interstate water disputes among themselves.”). 
234 The Great Lakes Basin Compact was created by American states bordering the Great 
Lakes, in part to protect water in the lakes from appropriation by the federal government on 
behalf of other states. See GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN SUSTAINABLE WATER 
RESOURCES AGREEMENT (2005), available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/ 
Great_Lakes-St_Lawrence_River_Basin_Sustainable_Water_Resources_Agreement.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2012). 
235 For a discussion of drought in the Eagle Ford Shale, see supra note 45 and accompanying 
text. Some climate science researchers believe that climate change will tend to exacerbate drought 
in the southwestern United States. See, e.g., Jay Gulledge & Dan Huber, Global Warming 
Contributing to Texas Drought, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Oct. 14, 2011), http:// 
www.c2es.org/blog/huberd/global-warming-contributing-texas-drought (exploring the question of 
whether climate change is increasing the risk of drought in Texas). 
236  See N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., RESPONDING TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN NEW YORK STATE: A SYNTHESIS REPORT (2011), available at http://www.nyserda. 
ny.gov/~/media/Files/Publications/Research/Environmental/EMEP/climaid/responding-to-climate-
change-synthesis.ashx?sc_database=web (detailing the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority’s projected increases in rainfall over the next century in the Marcellus 
Shale area as a result of climate change). 
237 Once the fracturing operation is complete and the well is producing natural gas, its local 
impact is less significant. While the well pad creates a permanent change on the surface of the 
land, the noise, truck traffic, and vibrations associated with the fracturing operation itself do not 
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fracking is an industrial process. Like other such processes, it can affect the 
air quality, water quality, and visual aspects of the nearby environment. It 
may also result in noise, social disruption, and other consequences of 
industrialization. Following well completion, the production phase is much 
quieter, but the cumulative effects of fracking are profound and atypical, 
regardless of whether they take place in urban or rural settings. These 
impacts can pose difficult political problems for state and local govern-
ments. In rural areas, fracking has divided small towns, pitting longtime 
residents (seeking additional sources of income) against more recent arrivals 
(seeking a peaceful refuge from the city). It also can divide those who stand 
to earn production royalties against those who do not.238 In urban and 
presumably wealthier areas, fracking can provoke opposition from better-
funded and more-sophisticated NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) groups. 
When fracking meets political resistance, elected local government leaders 
may respond with ordinances banning or restricting fracking. The City 
Council of Pittsburgh passed an ordinance banning fracking within the city 
limits in late 2010,239 and other communities within the Marcellus Shale and 
beyond have taken similar actions.240 Most local communities have zoning 
codes which specify where industrial uses may or may not take place. 
However, because towns, villages, and counties are political subdivisions of 
the state, state law may preempt local law just as federal law sometimes 
preempts state law.241 On the other hand, some states have so-called “home 
rule” provisions which expressly reserve to local governments the power to 
regulate property use.242  
 
continue into the production phase. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV’N, supra 
note 43, at 6-304.  
238 See Peter Applebome, A New York Village’s Debate over Drilling Turns Personal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2011, at 1 (“The dispute has pitted neighbor against neighbor, and has often set people 
who live in suburbs or villages against the farmers and landowners who live outside them.”); see 
also Eliza Griswold, Situation Normal All Fracked Up, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 20, 2011, at 44, 47 
(“In Amwell Township [Pennsylvania], your opinion of fracking tends to correspond with how 
much money you’re making and with how close you live to the gas wells, chemical ponds, 
pipelines and compressor stations springing up in the area.”). 
239 Pittsburgh Bans Natural Gas Drilling, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2010/11/16/national/main7060953.shtml. 
240 Sabrina Tavernise, As Gas Drilling Spreads, Towns Stand Ground over Control, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2011, at A20 (describing how jurisdictions from Dryden, New York, to Flower Mound, 
Texas, have all used ordinances to restrict companies’ ability to pursue fracking opportunities). 
241 For an older discussion of this issue as it has played out in California, see Thomas M. 
Montgomery, State Pre-emption and Local Legislation, 4 SANTA CLARA LAW. 188, 191-93 (1963). 
242 For example, New York’s constitution has just such a provision. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 2(b)(2) (limiting the power of the state legislature “in relation to the property, affairs or 
government of any local government”). 
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Despite New York’s home-rule provision, the New York State Envi-
ronmental Code expressly preempts local laws regulating oil and gas 
production (while permitting local control over roads and real property 
taxes).243 In at least one case, a New York court invalidated a local zoning 
ordinance that imposed a bond requirement and permit fee on prospective 
natural gas producers, citing the statutory-preemption provision.244 However, 
there is contrary precedent as well,245 including a February 2012 New York 
State trial court decision upholding a local ban on fracturing in the town of 
Dryden, New York, under the state constitution’s home-rule provision.246 
In Pennsylvania, the gradual migration of fracturing operations from rural 
to more urban settings has provoked legislation limiting the ability of local 
communities to control fracking operations through zoning laws.247 By 
contrast, the New York legislature is now considering legislation that would 
expressly permit local communities to use zoning laws to limit or exclude 
 
243 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2012) (“The provisions of 
this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and 
solutions mining industries . . . .”). 
244 Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 454 
N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1982). That case did not involve fracking, however. 
245 For a good discussion of state preemption of local law in New York and Pennsylvania, see 
Michelle L. Kennedy, The Exercise of Local Control over Gas Extraction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 375, 380-90 (2011). 
246 See Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 471 (Sup. Ct. 
2012); Rachel Stern, Judge: Dryden Can Block Gas Drilling in Community, ITHACA J. (N.Y.) (Feb. 21, 
2012), http://www.theithacajournal.com/article/20120221/NEWS01/202210394/Judge-Dryden-can-
block-gas-drilling-community (noting the judge’s reasoning that local regulation of oil and gas 
development is preempted, but that communities retain their ability to block industrial uses 
within their borders using zoning laws). For another case upholding a town’s right to use zoning 
laws to ban fracking under New York’s home-rule provision, see Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. 
Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 779-80 (Sup. Ct. 2012), and compare Jeffrey v. Ryan, No. 
2012-01254, 2012 WL 4513348, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (striking down an anti-fracking 
ordinance, but upholding the right of municipalities to use zoning laws to limit or prohibit 
unwanted land uses). 
247 The new law, called “Act 13,” gives local governments the power to impose (and share 
revenue from) fees imposed on fracking, but also gives the Pennsylvania Public Utilities 
Commission the power to disapprove of local ordinances that would regulate fracking. 58 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–2354 (2012); see also Tavernise, supra note 240, at A20 (“As energy 
companies move to drill in densely populated areas from Pennsylvania to Texas, battles are 
breaking out over who will have the final say in managing the shale gas boom.”); Act 13  
(Impact Fee), PA. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.puc.state.pa.us/filing_resources/issues_laws_ 
regulations/act_13_impact_fee_.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (explaining the new law, including 
the collection and distribution of the gas well fees). As of this writing, at least one court has held 
that the Pennsylvania Constitution protects the rights of local communities to use zoning to 
restrict fracking. See Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, No. 284-2012, 2012 WL 3030277, at 
*26 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 26, 2012) (en banc) (upholding Act 13 as a valid exercise of the police 
power that promotes the health, safety, and welfare of the state by “establishing zoning guidance to 
local municipalities that ensure the uniform and optimal development of oil and gas resources”). 
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fracking within their borders.248  In Texas, some of the Barnett Shale 
communities use zoning laws to steer fracking and other gas production 
activities to areas zoned for industrial uses.249  
These stories indicate that states and local governments are continuing 
to grapple with the question of how (and how much) to regulate fracking 
based on its local impacts. As difficult as these issues are, they are issues of 
state and local concern. Ongoing battles over local ordinances, and over 
whether state regulatory requirements ought to preempt local requirements 
are understandable, and even appropriate. Local governments are political 
subdivisions of the state, and ultimately these issues will and should be 
resolved at the state level.250 
3.  Fugitive Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
At least one of the impacts of fracking is not solely a local concern: the 
emission of methane from natural gas–gathering and –processing opera-
tions. Research into this issue is in its infancy, and there is a great deal  
of disagreement about the actual level of emissions. However, as noted 
previously,251 some analysts contend that gas production operations release 
significant amounts of methane into the atmosphere. These emissions are 
not merely of local concern because methane is a potent greenhouse gas. 
Indeed, it is far more potent than carbon dioxide.252 Methane emissions 
thus contribute to a problem that not only extends beyond state boundaries, 
 
248 This bill has passed the New York State Assembly, and as of this writing is under consid-
eration in the New York State Senate. S.B. 3472, 2011 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (ensuring that 
state laws are not used to “prevent any local government from . . . enacting or enforcing local 
zoning ordinances or laws which determine permissible uses in zoning districts”). Presumably, any 
state or local bans enacted after drillers have secured rights to the mineral estate might be 
vulnerable to regulatory takings claims if the owners could have reasonably expected to drill under 
prior law. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (holding that 
regulation prohibiting any economically beneficial use of the property interest amounts to a 
taking). But cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) 
(upholding a state anti-subsidence act against mining companies’ taking claims). For a summary of 
other recent state-legislative developments on this issue, see Pierre Bertrand, State Fracking Laws 
Expand as Ohio Is Set to Approve its own Bill, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 24, 2012), http://www. 
ibtimes.com/articles/345100/20120524/fracking-ohio-vote-house-chemicals-disclosure.htm. 
249 See, e.g., CEDAR HILL, TEX., ORDINANCES ch. 13, art. II, § 13-19 (limiting the city zones 
in which companies can extract natural resources), available at http://library.municode.com/ 
HTML/11825/level3/PTIICOOR_CH13NAENRE_ARTIISTFAEXSI.html#PTIICOOR_CH13
NAENRE_ARTIISTFAEXSI_S13-19La20 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); Natural Gas Exploration, 
CITY CEDAR HILL, TEX., http://www.cedarhilltx.com/index.aspx?NID=915 (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012) (explaining the local ordinances governing natural gas deposits in the Barnett Shale). 
250 See infra Section IV.B for a discussion of the effects of politics on these regulatory conflicts. 
251 See supra notes 58-59 (discussing the results—and critiques—of studies of methane leakage). 
252 Howarth et al., supra note 58, at 685. 
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but also beyond national boundaries. Even small amounts of methane can 
have significant climate-change impacts.253 These effects can, if significant 
enough, cancel out any climate-change benefits associated with replacing 
coal combustion with natural gas combustion (for example, in electricity 
production). Indeed, concern about the effects of fugitive methane emis-
sions from natural gas production has led some environmental groups to 
reverse their policies in support of natural gas as a bridge fuel to help the 
economy wean itself from fossil fuels.254 
How might federal regulation address methane emissions from fracking 
operations? Fugitive methane emissions are one focus of the ongoing EPA 
study of fracking. Assuming the agency concludes that fugitive methane 
emissions are a significant problem worthy of federal attention, does it have 
existing authority to regulate those emissions? As a preliminary matter, it 
seems clear that methane is a pollutant subject to EPA regulation under the 
CAA. The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA255 
established that greenhouse gases fall within the CAA’s statutory definition 
of “air pollutant.”256 That decision led eventually to the EPA’s 2009 green-
house gas–tailoring rule, which regulates methane as a greenhouse gas.257 
The tailoring rule will require new or modified major sources of methane to 
obtain a permit and to employ best available control technology (BACT) to 
control their emissions of greenhouse gases.258 Major sources are those 
emitting 25,000 tons or more of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) annually.259 
Approximately 1000 tons of methane emissions are the CO2e of 25,000 tons 
 
253 Id. at 680. 
254 See Nocera, supra note 6, at A25 (“Unlike others in the environmental movement, [Presi-
dent Fred Krupp] and his colleagues at the Environmental Defense Fund don’t want to shut down 
fracking . . . .”). 
255 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
256 See id. at 529 (“Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are with-
out a doubt ‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . the ambient 
air’ . . . .”).  
257 40 C.F.R. § 98.6 (2012) (“Greenhouse gas or GHG means carbon dioxide (CO2), me-
thane (CH4) . . . .”).  
258 Id. §§ 52.21(J)(2), (3). 
259 See id. §§ 98.2(a)–(a)(2) (“The GHG reporting requirements and related monitoring, 
recordkeeping, and reporting requirements of this part apply to the owners and operators of any 
facility that is located in the United States [and] . . . that emits 25,000 metric tons CO2e or more 
per year in combined emissions . . . .”). Some sources are subject to higher thresholds. See, e.g., 
id. § 52.21(b)(49)(v) (explaining that in July 2011 new and existing stationary sources that will or 
have potential to emit 100,000 tons per year (tpy) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), as well as 
existing stationary sources that undertake physical or operational changes that result in emission 
increase of 75,000 tpy CO2e or more will be subject to regulation). 
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of carbon dioxide emissions.260 Thus, if a natural gas production facility emits 
more than 1000 tons of methane per year, it is covered by the EPA rule. The 
Congressional Research Service estimates that methane emissions from natural 
gas–production facilities comprise a very small percentage of American 
greenhouse gas emissions annually,261 but natural gas systems are the third 
largest source of methane emissions in the United States.262 It is not clear, 
however, that fracking operations or subsequent production from fracked 
wells will be covered by the EPA rule. 263 While it remains to be seen how 
many fracking operations or fracked production wells would be covered by 
the existing tailoring rule, it appears that the EPA has the authority to set 
its regulatory threshold at a level lower than 25,000 tons per year of CO2e, 
if it concludes that doing so is necessary to protect public health and the 
environment.264 Thus, if after completion of its fracking study the EPA 
concludes that fugitive methane emissions pose such a risk, it could address 
those emissions directly by expanding the tailoring rule to cover emissions 
from fracking operations or fracked production wells. 
In addition to the possibility of direct regulation of methane emissions 
under the tailoring rule, it appears that the EPA has another way to reduce 
climate change risks from fugitive methane emissions. The EPA has long 
regulated fugitive emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and 
sulfur dioxide from natural gas processing units,265 and recently finalized a 
 
260 ASHLEY PETTUS, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, METHANE: TAPPING THE UNTAPPED 
POTENTIAL 3 (2009), available at http://www.catf.us/resources/whitepapers/files/Methane-Tapping_ 
the_Untapped_Potential.pdf. 
261 EPA, EPA 430-R-12-001, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990-2010, at 2-1 fig. 2-1 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ 
ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf. 
262 KELSI BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40813, METHANE CAPTURE: 
OPTIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION REDUCTION 14 (2010). 
263 The EPA’s proposed rules governing fugitive emissions from gas production operations 
estimate that fugitive emissions from hydraulically fractured wells are about 200 times those of 
conventional gas wells, primarily because of gaseous compounds that escaped to the atmosphere 
during the production of flowback water. The EPA estimates emissions of about 23 tons of volatile 
organic compounds per fracturing operation, which implies that methane emissions ought to be 
less than 1,000 tons per year. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and 
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,738, 52,757 
(Aug. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).  
264 Indeed, one of the challenges to the tailoring rule is that the EPA has set the threshold 
too high, and that the statute does not authorize the EPA to ignore smaller sources. Petition for 
Review at 1, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 10-1205 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 2010).  
265 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.630–.636 (2012) (regulating the standards of performance for 
equipment leaks of VOCs from onshore natural gas processing). Natural gas “processing” includes 
the activities by which gases are separated from liquids upon production, and various compounds 
are separated from methane. “Processing” also encompasses the operation that prepares natural gas 
for introduction into the pipeline system. These rules cover processing operations and explicitly 
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suite of new rules strengthening the regulation of those emissions.266 VOCs 
are organic chemical substances whose compounds allow them to vaporize 
under normal temperatures and conditions.267 The EPA regulates VOCs as 
precursors of ozone, and therefore defines VOCs as organic chemical 
compounds that “participate . . . in atmospheric photochemical reactions.”268 
The Agency’s list of VOCs includes several methane compounds; accord-
ingly, measures taken to reduce emissions of these listed compounds will 
reduce methane emissions.269 The EPA recently proposed rules that would 
apply to fracking operations, in hopes of achieving a 95% reduction in VOC 
emissions from fracked gas wells.270 These regulations neither require indi-
vidual permits nor impose a technology-based emissions standard. Instead, 
they impose operational performance standards—specified procedures 
designed to minimize emissions, including standards governing well 
completion271 following fracking operations. For example, the rules require 
“green” well completion, a series of measures that separate salable natural 
gas from liquids and provide combustion of gas that would otherwise be 
vented.272 The rules also specify leak control equipment for compressors 
and mandate emissions reductions from storage tanks, among other 
 
do not cover operations upstream of processing. The EPA also regulates VOC emissions from 
petroleum refineries. See id. §§ 60.590–.593 (regulating the standards of performance for 
equipment leaks of VOCs in petroleum refineries). 
266 See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emis-
sion Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63) (creating new source performance standards for onshore 
natural gas–processing plants and finalizing risk- and technology-review procedures for natural gas 
production, transmission, and storage). 
267 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): Technical Overview, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/iaq/ 
voc2.html (last updated June 21, 2012). 
268 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(s). 
269 Volatile Organic Compounds Master List, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/iaq/base/voc_master_ 
list.html (last updated Apr. 3, 2012). 
270 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emissions 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,738, 52,746 (Aug. 23, 2011). 
271 Well completion refers to the steps immediately preceding production from the well. The 
process can include inserting and cementing-in well casing as well as fracking to stimulate 
production. Flowback water may be produced during this phase, and the production of flowback 
water can entail significant venting of methane and nonmethane VOCs to the atmosphere. See id. 
at 52,757 (“Wells that are fractured generally have great amounts of emissions because of the 
extended length of the flowback period required to purge the well of the fluids and sand that are 
associated with the fracturing operation.”). 
272 See id. at 52,758 (“[W]e are proposing an operational standard . . . that would require a 
combination of REC [Reduced Emissions Completions] and pit flaring to minimize venting of  
gas . . . .”). The EPA estimates that of the 25,000 or so new wells constructed annually, only about 
3000-4000 currently use green completion. Id. The agency estimates that, as a result of the rule, 
21,000 wells will use green completion. Id. 
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things.273 The EPA projects a reduction in methane emissions of about 62 
million metric tons as a result of its proposed rules, which represents about 
a 26% reduction in emissions from the natural gas sector.274 
Presumably, the EPA’s ongoing study of fracking will continue to exam-
ine fugitive methane emissions from fracking operations and methane 
production from fracked wells. Given that the Agency has yet to finalize its 
rules on fugitive emissions from natural-gas production operations, it seems 
likely that it will have ample opportunity to incorporate lessons learned 
from the fracking study into its final rules. The EPA may choose to 
strengthen existing requirements governing fugitive methane emissions, or 
it could establish model standards for states to follow, similar to model 
building codes established by the Department of Energy to promote energy 
efficiency.275 Thus, it appears that the EPA is already well-equipped to address 
the impacts of fracking operations on climate change should its study of the 
industry dictate that existing emissions control measures are insufficient. 
4. Wastewater Disposal 
Some methods of disposing of fracking wastewater, such as direct or 
indirect disposal in interstate waters, have a direct interstate effect. These 
disposal methods are already subject to federal regulation under the CWA.276 
Similarly, disposal of fracking wastewater (either flowback water or produced 
water) that does not satisfy CWA disposal requirements because of the 
radiation in the wastewater277 is also subject to existing federal regulatory 
 
273 Id. at 52,746. In this respect, the EPA’s rules might be justified using the second rationale 
for federal regulation: the desirability of having uniform equipment standards for manufacturers 
on efficiency grounds. The EPA need not specify technology standards, but rather could specify 
performance standards for technology, such as maximum leakage rates for compressors, pipe 
joints, etc.  
274 Id. at 52,792. 
275 See Status of State Energy Codes, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.energycodes.gov/states/ 
(last updated Aug. 2012) (providing maps and current statuses for commercial and residential 
building energy codes operable at state levels). Alternatively, as James Connaughton has 
suggested, federal agencies could use the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 1, 110 Stat. 775 (1996), to incentivize states to develop and standardize 
new technologies. James Connaughton, Exec. V.P. of Corp. Affairs, Public, & Envtl. Policy, 
Constellation Energy, Address at Searle Center Conference on Federalism and Energy in the 
United States at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 1, 2012). 
276 See supra notes 53, 217-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of CWA regulation of 
direct discharges to surface waters and discharges to pretreatment facilities. 
277 This radiation is often described as “naturally occurring radioactive material.” See supra 
note 51. 
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regimes governing the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes.278 Outside 
the Northeast, operators may dispose of wastewater using underground 
injection wells. This process is federally regulated under the SDWA.279  
In spite of this federal regulation, there remain some troubling regulatory 
issues associated with wastewater disposal. Some of the worst reported 
contamination associated with fracking operations is associated with on-site 
disposal of wastes, such as covering and leaving in place waste lagoons that 
leaked into groundwater.280 Some of these methods may have been permit-
ted by state rules in effect at the times of disposal.281 The effects of these 
externalities are certainly felt locally, and states have every incentive to 
address them. Indeed, it appears that states have amended their laws to 
prohibit these sorts of on-site, surface-disposal options.282  New York’s 
proposal to require the use of lined tanks rather than pits for liquid storage 
at drill sites aims at this problem.  
An additional concern is that underground injection of wastewater may 
be associated with seismic activity (i.e., earthquakes) in some locations, 
though some fear that fracking operations (rather than underground 
wastewater disposal) are to blame.283 If an underground injection well is 
placed in the wrong location, injecting increasing quantities of wastewater 
into the well can result in seismicity. The ability of underground injections 
to trigger seismic events is well-documented.284 Recent earthquakes linked 
to fracking operations in Ohio,285 Oklahoma,286 and Arkansas287 all appear 
 
278 See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (2006) (establishing a federalism-based approach to regulating 
certain types of low-level radioactive waste). 
279 See OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, EPA-816-R-02-025, TECHNICAL PROGRAM REVIEW: 
UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL REGULATIONS 4 (2001), available at http://water.epa. 
gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/2004_5_3_uicv_techguide_uic_tech_overview_uic_regs.pdf (“Due to 
disparate levels of protection afforded ground water under the State injection well programs at the 
time, Congress passed the SDWA . . . .”). 
280 See Griswold, supra note 238, at 49 (“[A]top a hill, about 1,500 feet from her home and 
less than 800 feet from that of her neighbor, Beth Voyles, there was an open, five-acre chemical 
impoundment filled with chemically treated water.”). 
281 See Urbina & McGinty, supra note 57 (noting that state regulations did not protect land-
owners from contaminated water caused by gas drilling on their land). 
282 For a description of the amendment to the Pennsylvania laws, see supra note 135 and accom-
panying text, and for the proposed New York rules, see supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
283 For a discussion of fracking’s seismic impacts, see infra note 290. See also Henry Foun-
tain, Add Quakes to Rumblings over Gas Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at D1 (describing 
earthquakes in Youngstown, Ohio—a seismically inactive area—associated with disposal of 
fracking waste). 
284 See, e.g., OFFICE OF WATER, supra note 279, at 3 (observing that, as early as 1967, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers already had determined that underground waste disposal was 
causing significant seismic activity near Denver, Colorado).  
285 See Fountain, supra note 283. 
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to be the products of disposal of wastewater from gas-production opera-
tions. The SDWA underground injection well regulations authorize EPA to 
consider seismicity and proximity to faults when permitting various classes 
of underground injection wells, but there is no such admonition specifically 
in connection with Class II wells, the class of wells governing disposal of oil 
and gas wastes.288 The EPA and state agencies to which it has delegated 
permitting jurisdiction do have the power to shut down permitted under-
ground injection wells in the event the well is triggering earthquakes.289 
However, the EPA may wish to consider adding seismicity to the lists of 
reviews it undertakes for Class II wells. Furthermore, some experts believe 
that “micro-seismicity” can result directly from fracking operations under 
certain conditions, 290  though fracking-induced tremors ought to be far 
smaller in magnitude than those associated with underground injection for 
disposal, all else equal.291 The SDWA cannot address the seismic risks (if 
any) associated with the injection of fracking fluids underground, since 
fracking operations are exempt from SDWA permitting requirements.292 
Should the exemption from SDWA underground injection well–permitting 
requirements for fracking operations be revoked?  
 
286 See John Daly, U.S. Government Confirms Link Between Earthquakes and Hydraulic Fractur-
ing, OILPRICE.COM (Nov. 8, 2011), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/U.S.-Government-
Confirms-Link-Between-Earthquakes-and-Hydraulic-Fracturing.html (noting that the Oklahoma 
quakes were near 181 underground injection wells for disposal of wastewater). 
287 See Alec Liu & Jeremy A. Kaplan, Earthquakes in Arkansas May Be Man-Made, Experts 
Warn, FOX NEWS (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/03/01/fracking-earthquakes-
arkansas-man-experts-warn (ascribing Arkansas quakes to underground injection wells). 
288 33 C.F.R. § 144 (2012). 
289 See 40 C.F.R. § 146 (providing that sites could be closed if they do not comply with 
maintenance and site care requirements). 
290 See AUSTIN A. HOLLAND, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,  OF1-2011, EXAMINATION OF 
POSSIBLY INDUCED SEISMICITY FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE EOLA FIELD, GARVIN 
COUNTY, OKLAHOMA 12, 25 (2011), available at http://www.ogs.ou.edu/pubsscanned/openfile/ 
OF1_2011.pdf (documenting a correlation between fracking activity and small earthquakes, and 
suggesting that the fracking process could be the cause); Garry White, Cuadrilla Admits Drilling 
Caused Blackpool Earthquakes, TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
finance/newsbysector/energy/8864669/Cuadrilla-admits-drilling-caused-Blackpool-earthquakes.html 
(concluding that fracking operations very likely caused small tremors). 
291 See Fountain, supra note 283, at D3 (“Scientists say the likelihood of that link is extremely 
remote, that thousands of fracking and disposal wells operate nationwide without causing earth-
quakes, and that the relatively shallow depths of these wells mean that any earthquakes that are 
triggered would be minor.”); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV’N, supra note 43, at  
6-328 (“[T]here is essentially no increased risk to the public, infrastructure, or natural resources 
from induced seismicity related to hydraulic fracturing. The microseisms created by hydraulic 
fracturing are too small to be felt, or to cause damage at the ground surface or to nearby wells.”). 
292 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.  
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Certainly, earthquakes can be felt across state lines, depending upon 
their locations and magnitudes. On the other hand, there have been tens of 
thousands of fracking operations per year over the last several years,293 with 
very few associated incidents of seismicity. Of those few, the weight of the 
evidence so far supports the inference that wastewater disposal through 
underground injection is the more likely culprit. States are beginning to take 
action: Ohio recently announced its intention to strengthen its underground-
injection-well rules to address the seismicity problem.294 Like many issues 
associated with fracking, this one requires further study. At the present 
time, the seismic risks associated with fracking do not seem large enough to 
warrant a requirement that each fracking operation undergo SDWA permit-
ting. If further analysis reveals a stronger connection between the fracking 
process and earthquakes, an appropriate response could be for states or 
Congress to restrict fracking operations near known fault lines.  
5.  Groundwater Contamination 
Perhaps the highest-profile risk—the one that has garnered the most 
public attention—is the risk that fracking operations will contaminate 
groundwater, particularly drinking-water wells.295 Fracking fluids may be 
mixed and stored onsite in lagoons; flowback and produced water also 
accumulate onsite before disposal. If operators manage chemicals and water 
at the surface improperly, they can spill and leach into groundwater. Like-
wise, during the production phase methane can find its way into groundwa-
ter through leakage, if the production well is improperly constructed. Public 
fears, however, center on the possibility that the fracking operation itself 
may pose risks to groundwater.  
As noted previously, the regulation of groundwater contamination has 
traditionally been left to the states; the CWA’s permitting jurisdiction 
extends only to navigable surface waters and adjacent wetlands, and leaves 
to the states the task of regulating discharges into groundwater.296 The 
SDWA does protect sources of drinking water in a number of ways, including 
 
293 See ERNEST J. MONIZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY MIT STUDY 39 (2011) (noting that “over 20,000 shale wells” have been drilled in the last 
decade). 
294 See OHIO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NORTHSTAR 1 
CLASS II INJECTION WELL AND THE SEISMIC EVENTS IN THE YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO AREA 18 
(2012), available at http://media.cleveland.com/business_impact/other/UICReport.pdf (recom-
mending “a review of existing geologic data for known faulted areas within the state and [decisions 
to] avoid the locating of new Class II disposal wells within these areas”),. 
295 See supra Section I.B. 
296 See supra note 181. 
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through the establishment of the EPA’s underground injection–well 
permitting requirements, but fracking operations are exempt from those 
requirements.297 Presumably, the race to the bottom provides the primary 
rationale for federal regulation under the SDWA.298  
Because of public concern about groundwater contamination, the EPA, 
other regulatory agencies, and various research institutions have begun to 
study the risks fracking operations pose to drinking water wells. A 2011 
Cornell University study found a higher incidence of methane contamina-
tion in drinking-water wells located close to natural gas wells,299 though that 
study’s methodology did not permit the authors to determine whether the 
contamination preceded or followed the drilling of the gas wells nearby.300 
On the other hand, a 2011 Pennsylvania State University study sampled 
drinking-water wells before and after nearby fracking operations, and found 
no significant increase in well contamination from either methane or 
fracking fluid constituents.301 Earlier findings by MIT researchers reached 
similar, though tentative, conclusions,302 and preliminary findings from an 
ongoing University of Texas study echo the Penn State study.303 Additional 
research has produced yet more room for debate. A National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) study reached mixed conclusions, finding no evidence of 
groundwater contamination by fracking fluids or wastewater,304 but some 
evidence that levels of thermogenic methane (usually found in deep shale 
 
297 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
298 See infra Section IV.B. 
299 See Howarth et al., supra note 58, at 682-83 (finding that “fugitive methane emissions at 
well completion” comprised 0.01% of lifetime production for conventional natural gas wells and 
1.9% for shale gas wells).  
300 Cf. Michael Levi, Rebutting the Howarth Shale Gas Study, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
BLOG (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/05/20/rebutting-the-howarth-shale-gas-study 
(criticizing the study’s methodology more generally). 
301 ELIZABETH W. BOYER ET AL., CTR. FOR RURAL PA., THE IMPACT OF MARCELLUS 
GAS DRILLING ON RURAL DRINKING WATER SUPPLIES 16-18 (2011), available at http://www. 
rural.palegislature.us/documents/reports/Marcellus_and_drinking_water_2011_rev.pdf. 
302 See MONIZ ET AL., supra note 293, at 39. 
303 See GROAT & GRIMSHAW, supra note 84, at 18 (“[T]here is at present little or no evi-
dence of groundwater contamination from hydraulic fracturing of shales at normal depths.”). The 
Texas study, however, has come under attack alleging conflicts of interest on the part of the lead 
author. See Erik Stokstad, Fracking Report Criticized for Apparent Conflict of Interest, SCIENCE (July 
24, 2012), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/07/fracking-report-criticized-for-a.html 
(criticizing the Texas study’s author for failing to disclose his financial ties to the fracking 
industry). 
304 See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-
Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8175 (2011) (“[W]e found 
no evidence for contamination of the shallow wells near active drilling sites from deep brines 
and/or fracturing fluids.”). 
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formations) were higher in shallow groundwater aquifers near natural gas–
production wells than elsewhere in the same aquifers.305 Finally, a recent 
analysis by researchers at the State University of New York at Stony Brook 
sought to quantify the risks of groundwater contamination due to fracking 
operations, finding them “substantial.”306 
How can one reconcile these conflicting analyses? One possibility is that 
some of the studies released to date are simply failing to note instances of 
actual contamination that can, under the wrong circumstances, result 
directly from fracking. Different regions have different geological character-
istics, and perhaps some regions are particularly susceptible to groundwater 
contamination from fracking in ways that those examined in the Penn State 
and Texas studies are not. However, because of the great vertical distance 
between fracking operations and drinking water aquifers—usually over one 
mile—and the relative dearth of evidence of fracking-induced contamina-
tion, the more reasonable inference is that the fracking process does not 
directly cause incidents of groundwater contamination. Rather, it seems 
more likely that incidents of contamination result from poor well construc-
tion or sloppy chemical handling at the surface. If so, these incidents can be 
viewed as problems of compliance with existing regulations, since state laws 
require wells to be constructed so as to prevent leakage and chemical spills. 
Poor compliance, in turn, could be a function of inadequate enforcement or 
deterrence at the state level. Given that fracking operations over the last 
decade have numbered at least in the tens of thousands,307 some incidents of 
contamination from noncompliance (including significant noncompliance) 
are statistically likely. In any case, these groundwater issues represent 
mainly local, not interstate, concerns.  
In sum, it appears that most of the externalities of fracking are experi-
enced locally. Shale gas production can produce some risks that cross state 
boundaries, such as those associated with disposal of wastewater into 
interstate waters or fugitive emissions of methane. Some of these risks are 
 
305 See id. at 8174 (“The data do suggest gas-phase transport of methane upward to the shal-
low groundwater zones sampled for this study . . . .”). The authors of this study could not say 
how long ago the thermogenic methane found its way to shallower depths, or whether gas drilling 
was connected with its presence there. See id. at 8175. 
306 Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated with Natural Gas 
Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1382, 1388-91 (2012) (estimating the 
probabilities of various types of accidents that could result in a spill, and extrapolating from those 
probabilities to produce projected volumes of fracking wastewater that might find their way into 
groundwater or surface waters in the Marcellus Shale). 
307 Estimates of the number of fracking operations vary widely. The MIT study cites a figure 
of “over 20,000” in the last decade, while industry sources suggest much higher numbers. MONIZ 
ET AL., supra note 293, at 39. 
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already adequately addressed by federal law. Others, such as the risk of 
fugitive methane emissions, may not be. However, water supply issues, 
impacts to local character, and groundwater contamination are risks that 
locals almost always bear. Theoretically, then, states ought to be best suited 
to address those concerns through regulation—particularly since most of the 
direct economic benefits of shale gas production are realized by locals as 
well. In such situations, we might infer that those costs and benefits should 
be balanced within the confines of the state’s political system. That infer-
ence should be true if the state is willing and able to translate popular prefer-
ences into policy efficiently, a topic that is the subject of the next Section. 
B. State Capacity and the “Race to the Bottom”? 
If most of fracking’s effects are local, states should be in the best posi-
tion to balance costs and benefits and ought to build their regulatory 
infrastructures accordingly. However, some people, including at least a few 
government officials, have challenged the capacity of states to manage the 
regulatory process adequately.308 For example, commenting on the recently 
proposed New York fracking regulations, EPA Region II Administrator 
Judith Enck questioned whether the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) had sufficient staffing and other 
resources to handle the job.309 While states have reacted differently to the 
fracking rush, New York seems a particularly unlikely candidate for capture, 
since its government is controlled by Democrats and the state’s environ-
mental agency maintains regulatory authority over gas production. 310 
Indeed, New York has moved cautiously for the most part, studying the 
 
308 See, e.g., Tavernise, supra note 240 (reporting that the chairman of the Board of Supervi-
sors of Robinson Township, Pennsylvania, opposed a bill that would limit local government’s 
ability to regulate gas company operations because “[t]he state is not capable of monitoring even 
the most basic parts of this industry”) 
309 See Brian Nearing, EPA Questions Fracking Study, TIMES-UNION (Albany, N.Y.) (Jan. 12, 
2012), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/EPA-questions-fracking-study-2499294.php (reporting 
that Enck “questioned whether DEC, which has been dealing with staff cuts in recent years, is 
ready to oversee natural gas drilling”); cf. Melissa Troutman, Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale Waste 
Records Are Incomplete, ERIE WIRE (June 29, 2011), http://www.eriewire.org/archives/12066/ 
section/economy (“On May 12, [2011,] the . . . [EPA] sent Pennsylvania [Department of Environ-
mental Protection] Secretary Michael Krancer a letter ‘asking Pennsylvania to do a better job . . . 
monitoring and regulating Marcellus Shale wastewater discharges near public drinking water 
sources.’”). If one were to put desired policy outcomes before federalism principles, then one 
could justify federal regulation whenever a state’s regulatory response to a problem seems 
inadequate. As previously noted in the Introduction, however, this Article puts federalism 
principles before policy, and so addresses the question of which level of government is best suited 
to determine the appropriate policy response.  
310 See supra Section II.B.  
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problem and revising its regulations prior to permitting new fracking 
wells.311 This approach has resulted in the relatively slow growth in the 
number of gas wells drilled in New York over the last decade, at least in 
comparison to Pennsylvania and Texas.312 Those latter two states have been 
less cautious. Both have recently produced considerably more natural gas 
than New York,313 but their experiences with growth in this industry have 
been different from one another: fracking seems to have produced more 
problems and controversy in Pennsylvania than in Texas. 314  Do these 
differences reflect a race to the bottom in which local policymakers regulate 
less than they would otherwise like to in an effort to attract natural gas 
industry jobs and dollars? 
A recent University of Texas study examined state enforcement capacity 
in shale gas–producing states and found “wide variation” in the ratio of 
enforcement staff to the number of shale gas wells.315 Yet it concluded that 
“most states with current shale gas and related development have enforce-
ment capacity necessary to address at least some complaints associated with 
oil and gas development and to conduct independent enforcement ac-
tions.”316 This statement is relatively circumspect, to say the least, and the 
University of Texas study took a close look at only four states, including 
Texas (but excluding New York and Pennsylvania).317 Given that regulatory 
agencies routinely face budgetary constraints and information asymmetries 
in their efforts to regulate and monitor, it may very well be that rapid 
expansion in shale gas production has overwhelmed regulators in some 
states, particularly those without significant experience regulating natural 
gas production. Is this simply part of the regulatory lag problem? Can we 
assume that, as locals experience the externalities of fracking, they will 
expect their political leaders to regulate?  
We might infer that this is so, because decisions governing shale gas 
regulation are unlike the typical race-to-the-bottom scenario, such as a 
decision to locate a new manufacturing plant in one of several candidate 
states. In the latter case, multiple states compete for a single (or small 
number of) large and long-lived capital investments. One (or a few) can 
win; the rest will lose. While the manufacturing plant can be constructed 
 
311 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.  
312 See supra Table 2. 
313 Id.  
314 See supra notes 64 & 69 (discussing the spills in Dimock, Pennsylvania, and the blowout 
at a Chesapeake Energy well elsewhere in Pennsylvania). 
315 GROAT & GRIMSHAW, supra note 84, at 48. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. at 49, 51, 54-55. 
  
2013] Political Economy of Energy Production 495 
 
almost anywhere, absent legal impediments, fracking occurs only where 
shale gas deposits are found, and companies will invest in natural gas 
production wherever gas can be produced profitably. Investment in produc-
tion in one state does not preclude simultaneous investment in another; to 
the contrary, companies will invest simultaneously in hundreds of wells. 
States are not chasing limited investment capital, as in the usual race-to-
the-bottom scenario. Rather, in shale gas production, investment capital is 
chasing production opportunities. Thus, a state does not risk losing the 
economic benefits of shale gas development unless the regulatory costs it 
imposes on production are sufficient to render otherwise profitable produc-
tion unprofitable.318 Even then, the state does not lose that capital to 
another state forever; the capital may return if natural gas prices increase 
sufficiently to make production profitable within the state. Thus, a race to the 
bottom should not characterize state regulation of natural gas production.  
On the other hand, there is at least a theoretical argument that, unless 
the costs and benefits of shale gas production are evenly distributed 
throughout the state, state regulators may tend to underregulate because 
those who do not bear the costs of fracking outnumber those who do. 
Consider Figure 2 below which depicts a potentially productive shale gas 
area within the hypothetical “ABC State.” Consistent with the discussion in 
the previous Section, most of the external costs of shale gas production will 
fall primarily on the residents of Alphaville, though we might imagine some 
costs falling beyond the boundaries of Alphaville. Of course, Alphaville will 
capture some of the benefits of shale gas development as well, in the form 
of royalty payments to landowners, jobs, and the indirect economic benefits 
of production. The residents of Betaville, Gammaville, and Deltaville may 
also capture some of the benefits of shale gas production, including some of 
the ripple effects (secondary economic effects and state budgetary effects). 
If the costs are more closely concentrated than the benefits near the shale 
gas–production area in Alphaville, then it may be that the more numerous 
residents of Betaville, Gammaville, and Deltaville will vote in favor of 
relatively light regulation, outvoting their Alphaville counterparts. In that 
case, the residents of Alphaville may suffer from externalities that would 
have been outlawed or more closely regulated had they fallen upon a 
majority of the residents of ABC State. 
 
 
 
318 Absent a race to the bottom, states ought to regulate as they understand the risks of frack-
ing. If state budgets are inadequate to fund a proper regulatory response, regulators can charge 
permitting and other regulatory fees sufficient to fund the state regulatory apparatus. 
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Figure 2: ABC State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One solution would be to permit local governments to retain vetoes over 
shale gas production within their borders. That way, those closest to the 
costs and benefits would be able to dominate the policy decision. Indeed, 
there are countless local debates taking place nationwide over whether to 
permit shale gas development. While heated, these debates seem to reflect 
the very sort of political conflict over the relative merits of development 
versus environmental protection that one might expect to see in well-
functioning local democracies.319 On the other hand, providing local juris-
dictions with vetoes over shale gas production creates the potential for over-
regulation because locals who bear most of the costs of development might 
veto development with positive net social benefits. The real problem is that 
the distribution of the costs and benefits of production will never fall neatly 
within the boundaries of any political jurisdiction.320 
 
319 For accounts of divisions within local communities over the relative benefits of fracking, 
see supra notes 21 & 238 and accompanying text. 
320 The race-to-the-bottom literature explores this problematic mismatch between the distri-
bution of costs and benefits, on the one hand, and the distribution of votes within the decision-
making polity, on the other. See Johnston, supra note 146, at 614 (arguing that federal control over 
public goods maybe be “an instrument of inefficient majoritarian redistribution”); Revesz, supra 
note 159, at 1228-33 (arguing that voters and businesses will sort themselves into jurisdictions 
whose regulatory standards match their preferences and, therefore, that social welfare will be 
maximized by allowing locals to establish regulatory standards that balance environment and 
development according to their wishes). Daniel Ingberman demonstrates that this mismatch 
problem exists whenever the distribution of costs and impacts is imperfect, even when all costs 
and benefits remain within a single jurisdiction. See Daniel Ingberman, Siting Noxious Facilities: Are 
Markets Efficient?, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-20, S-23, S-25 (1995) (noting that if impacts 
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How, then, to address the risks of under- or overregulation caused by 
geographically mismatched costs and benefits? One possible solution to the 
problem of underregulation is for the winners (those who benefit from 
development) to compensate the losers (those who bear the external costs of 
development). However, compensation is a much neater solution theoreti-
cally than practically, in part because of moral hazard problems and political 
distortions. 321  Another possible solution is first to determine whether 
underregulation or overregulation is the bigger problem. If the regulation of 
shale gas development is left to states and their political subdivisions, the 
danger of overregulation appears to be fairly remote because most of the 
costs and benefits of production will be experienced by voters within the 
(potentially) regulating jurisdictions. Despite some states’ home-rule 
provisions, states can preempt local law, and it seems unlikely that local 
vetoes will prevent positive-net-benefit shale-gas development for long. If 
underregulation is likely to be the more common problem, it is difficult to 
see how federal regulation can help, since the mismatch between the people 
who bear the costs and those who reap the benefits is even greater at the 
national level.322 Moreover, in some shale gas–producing states, like those 
containing the Marcellus Shale, producing areas are fairly widely distributed, 
reducing the intrastate geographic mismatches among the relative distribu-
tions of costs and benefits pictured in Figure 2. For all of these reasons, a 
race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal regulation of fracking is not a 
persuasive one.  
C. National Interest in Shale-Gas Development? 
Is there a national interest in regulating or promoting natural-gas pro-
duction from shale using fracking, like the national interests previously 
articulated by Congress in promoting hydroelectric and nuclear energy 
development? In the past, national-interest rationales for comprehensive 
 
are concentrated on those closest to the noxious facility, a majority of voters within that boundary 
will suffer less-than-average impacts); see also Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic 
Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 
350-51 (1988) (arguing that state jurisdictional competition may not result in efficiency enhance-
ment if policy decisions deviate from the will of the public or if there are “conflicts of interest 
within a heterogeneous community”).  
321 See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther & Doug Easterling, The Role of Compensation in Siting Haz-
ardous Facilities, 15 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 608 (1996) (explaining why a compensation 
scheme might fail in practice despite its theoretical appeal).  
322 This idea is part of Revesz’s response to critics of his argument against the race-to-the-
bottom hypothesis. See Revesz, supra note 160, at 542 (“[G]iven the standard public choice 
argument for federal environmental regulation, it is not clear why the problems observed at the 
state level would not be replicated at the federal level.”). 
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energy facility licensing regimes have been predicated on important national 
needs (akin to national emergencies) or important security objectives arising 
around a particular industry. Thus, for example, the Atomic Energy Act 
was passed to control and regulate the development of the most potentially 
destructive force then known to humankind. 323  Congress’s decision to 
consolidate the regulation of that development in a single federal agency 
(the NRC) was based, in significant part, on safety and national security 
reasons.324 The Federal Power Act was one of several New Deal laws aimed 
at promoting energy infrastructure and development in rural areas during 
the Great Depression.325 It was part of a pro-development response to a 
national emergency, which in Congress’s view necessitated the delegation of 
strong powers to the Federal Power Commission to preempt state regula-
tion of hydropower.326 Congress has also tended to apply the national 
interest rationale to energy facilities that produce externalities extending 
across state lines or into national waters. Thus, the centralized regulatory 
system governing leasing of oil exploration on the Outer Continental Shelf 
addresses not only energy security but also high-magnitude environmental 
risks in national waters.327  
The last decade has seen tens of thousands—and possibly hundreds of 
thousands—of fracking operations conducted nationwide.328 While there is 
no comprehensive registry of reports of environmental, health, and safety 
problems caused by fracking, their number appears to be quite small when 
compared to the number of fracking operations conducted. We cannot be 
certain yet whether those reports reflect serious problems pervading the 
industry or the expected incidence of compliance failures with otherwise 
adequate regulations. Numerous government agencies and NGOs are 
studying the environmental, health, and safety impacts of fracking opera-
tions. Many of the problems studied seem likely candidates for technical or 
 
323 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006). 
324 See id. (acknowledging the Atomic Energy Act’s “paramount objective of making the maxi-
mum contribution to the common defense and security,” as well as its goal of promoting world 
peace). 
325 The national interest in those cases was an economic development interest. Rural Elec-
trification Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-605, 49 Stat. 1363 (codified as amended in 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 901–918c); Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 791–823(d)); Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (codified as amended 
in 16 U.S.C. §§ 831–831ee).  
326 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. 
327 43 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1351. Similarly, Congress sought to stimulate development of LNG 
imports as an energy security measure by establishing a centralized national licensing regime for 
LNG terminals. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1). 
328 See supra note 302. 
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procedural solutions, which can be implemented by states or existing federal 
regulatory authorities. In this setting, it seems unnecessary, and certainly 
premature, to conclude that shale-gas production has created the kind of 
pressing national need that would justify a centralized federal licensing or 
regulatory regime. 
On the other hand, it appears at first glance that regulation promoting 
natural gas development might be justified on energy security grounds, 
since natural gas is a plentiful domestic resource.329 Historically, natural gas 
markets have been characterized by price volatility,330 reflecting a market in 
which (1) demand has varied considerably over the short term,331 particularly 
in colder climates where natural gas was used as the primary heating fuel; 
and (2) there was (and is) insufficient storage capacity332 to cope with large, 
short-term variations in demand. After the mid-1980s, natural gas demand in 
the United States increased steadily333—as did imports—until 2005.334 Around 
that time, natural gas price movements began to diverge from those of oil 
 
329 It is important to make a distinction between “energy security” and “dependence upon 
imports.” Some analysts argue that the United States will always import and export energy as a 
function of its active participation in world markets, and that it is important not to equate energy 
security with the absence of dependence upon imports. Nevertheless, it seems almost axiomatic to 
acknowledge that the increased amounts of domestic resources can enhance energy security, all 
else being equal. 
330 Domestic U.S. natural gas prices were distorted considerably by federal regulation be-
tween 1955 and 1985. Between 1955 and 1978, the Federal Power Commission, predecessor to 
FERC, regulated wellhead prices (at the direction of the Supreme Court), leading to such serious 
shortages that Congress enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 
92 Stat. 3350, which gradually deregulated wellhead prices over the next several years. For a full 
chronology of these events, see Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competi-
tion in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 356, 371-72 (1983). For a description of the 
strange and unpredictable trajectory of natural gas prices during the slow deregulation process 
under the NGPA, see JAMES M. GRIFFIN & HENRY B. STEELE, ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND 
POLICY 301-03 (2d ed. 1986). 
331 An examination of monthly natural gas demand in the United States reflects considerable 
seasonal variation. See Natural Gas Consumption in the United States, 2007–2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/monthly/pdf/table_02.pdf (displaying monthly natural gas 
consumption data) (last updated Sept. 2012). 
332 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SR-OSAF/2001-06, U.S. NATURAL GAS MARKETS: 
MID-TERM PROSPECTS FOR NATURAL GAS SUPPLY (2001) (“Like wellhead natural gas supplies, 
other sources of natural gas supply were also relatively inelastic. For example, while the volume of 
weather-sensitive natural gas consumption has grown, the capability of natural gas storage facilities to 
reduce high prices during periods of high winter demand appears to have diminished.”). 
333 See U.S. Natural Gas Total Consumption, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia. 
gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9140us2a.htm (charting total yearly national gas consumption data from 1949 
to 2010) (last updated Nov. 2, 2012).  
334 See U.S. Natural Gas Imports, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ 
hist/n9100us2m.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 2012). 
  
500 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 431 
 
prices, and imports began to decline.335 A large part of the reason for these 
developments was the new availability of plentiful, domestically produced 
shale gas.336 The availability of large quantities of domestically produced gas 
has stabilized natural gas markets, reducing prices from more than $13 per 
MMBtu in 2006 to less than $3 per MMBtu in January 2012.337 This ample 
supply offers American policymakers and consumers the increased energy 
security that comes with the knowledge that the United States has domestic 
reserves sufficient to meet consumer demand for a long time to come.338  
However, the nature of the energy security gains provided by this 
source of domestic supply depends upon a number of factors. Currently, 
Americans use natural gas primarily for electricity generation and domestic 
heating and cooking.339 A reliable supply of inexpensive natural gas could 
alter the profile of natural gas in the American electric generation mix. 
Natural gas–fired generation currently comprises a little more than 20% of 
the American electric generation mix,340 and natural gas has been the 
 
335 See Reinout De Bock & José Gijón, Will Natural Gas Prices Decouple from Oil Prices Across 
the Pond? 19 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/11/143, 2011), available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11143.pdf (“Econometric analysis shows that the tight link between 
US gas and spot oil prices has weakened. This decoupling coincided with a significant increase in 
the production of non-conventional gas (especially shale gas) in the US. The additional supply has 
discontinued plans for sizable LNG imports into the US . . . .”); see also id. at 7 fig. 4 (comparing 
natural gas wellhead and Western Texas Intermediate oil prices from 1990 to 2010). 
336 It is not that plentiful supplies of domestically produced gas prevent Americans from 
being dependent upon unstable, faraway regimes; to the contrary, the vast majority of American 
natural gas imports come from Canada and Mexico (via pipeline). However, imports of LNG 
were beginning to comprise an increasing percentage of American imports prior to the increased 
availability of domestic shale gas in the early 2000s. The lion’s share of LNG imports in recent 
years have come from Egypt and Trinidad and Tobago. U.S. Natural Gas Imports by Country, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/NG_MOVE_IMPC_S1_ 
M.htm. 
337 See Natural Gas Spot Prices Near 10-Year Lows Amid Warm Weather and Robust Supplies, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4810 
(“Average spot natural gas prices for January were $2.68/MMBtu. Spot natural gas prices in 
January 2012 reached their lowest level in 10 years except for a 4-day period over the Labor Day 
weekend in 2009.”). 
338 Estimates of reserves are stated as a function of price, among other things. Thus, the 
amount of recoverable reserves in any gas formation at price X will be less than the amount 
recoverable at price 2x. In late 2011, the EIA revised its estimate of recoverable reserves in 
American shale gas formations downward by about 41%, a revision that was partly attributable to 
the fall in natural gas prices caused by increased supply. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-
0383, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012: WITH PREDICTION TO 2035 (2012), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282012%29.pdf. 
339 Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm. 
340 See Electric Power Annual 2011: Summary Statistics for the United States, 1999 Through 2010, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 2012), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/tablees1.pdf 
(displaying electricity generation statistics from 1999 through 2010). 
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fastest-growing electric generation fuel (by total generating capacity added) 
over the last decade.341 Increasing our natural gas–fired electric generating 
capacity does little or nothing to increase energy security, since the fuels 
that natural gas would displace are domestically produced. Coal-fired power 
generation (a little less than 50% of the current generation mix), nuclear 
power (about 20%), and renewable power (about 10%) all rely on domesti-
cally available sources.342 However, if the United States were to expand its 
uses of natural gas to include transportation, domestic natural gas might 
displace some petroleum imports, enhancing the country’s energy security. 
An examination of the possible conversion of the United States’ vehicle 
fleet from gasoline to natural gas is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is 
clear that such a conversion is technically feasible. Many government and 
corporate vehicle fleets currently run on natural gas,343 and at least one 
commercially available consumer automobile model runs on natural gas.344 
On the other hand, a larger-scale conversion would require an enormous 
investment in infrastructure for refueling a natural gas–powered consumer 
vehicle fleet, an investment that seems unlikely in the near term given the 
dearth of such proposals in Congress and the lack of any encouragement for 
such a move from the federal energy bureaucracy.345 Absent a national 
commitment to such a conversion, the energy security argument for a 
national regulatory regime to ensure natural gas production remains an 
unpersuasive one. 
However, such a regime might be justified in furtherance of another 
national objective—the protection of public health and the environment 
 
341 Id. 
342 Id. 
343 See MARCY ROOD WERPY ET AL., DRAFT WHITE PAPER ON NATURAL GAS VEHI-
CLES: STATUS, BARRIERS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2009), available at http://www1.eere.energy. 
gov/cleancities/pdfs/clean_cities_workshop_natural_gas.pdf (“In general, the NGV [natural gas 
vehicle] strategy in the United States has been to pursue high-fuel-use, urban fleets capable of 
central refueling. This market includes fleets of buses, trash haulers, taxis, and shuttle, delivery, 
port, and airport vehicles.”). 
344 See Craig Trudell & Alan Ohnsman, Chrysler to Begin Natural-Gas Truck Sales to Fleets in 
2012, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-
17/chrysler-to-begin-natural-gas-truck-sales-to-fleets-in-2012.html (“Honda Motor Co. is the only 
automaker selling cars with compressed natural-gas engines to retail customers in the U.S. with its 
$26,155 Civic Natural Gas sedan. The model, formerly the Civic GX, has sold mainly in California 
and a small number of other U.S. states that have fueling facilities.”). 
345 See Gustavo Collantes & Marc W. Melaina, The Co-Evolution of Alternative Fuel Infra-
structure and Vehicles: A Study of the Experience of Argentina with Compressed Natural Gas, 39 
ENERGY POL’Y 664, 664 (2011) (“A common denominator of alternative fuel polices has been the 
discussion over how to coordinate the development of a refueling infrastructure with the deployment 
of alternative fuel vehicles . . . . Despite . . . efforts, there have been few U.S. success stories to 
date (e.g., E85 [Ethanol-85] in Minnesota) among a long list of stalled or failed programs.”). 
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through the reduction of air pollution. Two 2011 studies—one by public 
health and medical professionals, and another by economists—are illustra-
tive of a larger literature pointing toward the conclusion that the displace-
ment of coal-fired electric generation by natural gas–fired generation would 
yield enormous public welfare benefits. The first study, reported in the 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (a multidisciplinary scientific 
journal), examined the health effects of the coal industry on a lifecycle basis, 
estimated health impacts (premature deaths, illness, and injuries) from the  
extraction, processing, transport, and combustion of coal, and sought to 
quantify the value of these external costs.346 The authors, a large group of 
researchers from various public health and academic institutions,347 estimat-
ed that these externalities cost the American public as much as half a trillion 
dollars each year,348 and “conservatively” estimated that if these costs were 
internalized (that is, borne by the industry), the price of electricity generat-
ed from coal would double or triple.349  
The second study, reported in the American Economic Review, offered a 
framework for integrating environmental externalities into national eco-
nomic accounts, by quantifying damages associated with air pollution 
emissions from 820 industries (including all of the major polluting indus-
tries) and comparing the harm with the value added to the economy by 
those industries.350 The authors concluded that the ratio of environmental 
damage to value added for eight of those industries, including oil- and coal-
fired power plants, but not natural gas–fired power plants, was greater than 
one.351 The authors concluded further that coal-fired combustion created by 
far the largest amount of environmental damage of any industry in the 
United States, which they estimated at approximately $53 billion per year.352 
By contrast, they estimated environmental damages from natural gas–fired 
production to be less than $1 billion per year.353 The authors estimated the 
 
346 Epstein et al., supra note 38, at 73. 
347 These institutions included the Harvard Medical School, the Harvard School of Public 
Health, the Boston University School of Public Health, the Department of Pharmacology at 
Washington State University, and the Department of Community Medicine at West Virginia 
University. Id. 
348 Id. at 91. 
349 Id. at 93. 
350 Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the United States Econo-
my, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1664 tbl.1 (2011). 
351 Id. at 1665 tbl.2. The ratio of environmental damage to value added was higher for oil-
fired generation (5.13) and for coal-fired generation (2.20), and higher still for solid waste combustion 
and incineration (6.72), than for natural gas–fired generation (0.34). Id. at 1665, 1670.  
352 Id. at 1667. The next-largest amount of environmental damage was associated with the 
crop-production industry, at $15.3 billion. Id. at 1665. 
353 Id. at 1669. 
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costs of coal-fired generation to be approximately 2.8 cents per kilowatt 
hour (cents/kwh), from oil-fired generation to be 2 cents/kwh, and from 
natural gas–fired generation to be approximately 0.1 cents/kwh.354  
According to both of these studies, the bulk of the harm from coal com-
bustion is attributable to mortality resulting from emissions of conventional 
air pollutants, primarily sulfur dioxide, fine particles, and nitrogen oxides. 
Environmental harm from greenhouse gas emissions pales in comparison, 
representing well under 1% of the harm estimated in the American Economic 
Review analysis. Stated differently, these studies imply that “the regulated 
levels of emissions from the industr[ies]” where environmental damage 
exceeds value added “are too high.”355 Other studies have reached similar 
conclusions,356 and offer further support for the notion that coal combustion 
imposes very large mortality, morbidity, and environmental costs on 
American society—costs that dwarf those associated with natural gas–fired 
power.357 In fact, in 1970, Congress established a national policy aimed at 
this type of harm when it resolved to “protect and enhance the quality of 
the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and 
the productive capacity of its population” through the passage of the CAA.358  
 Does the existence of a national policy in favor of cleaner air imply the 
need to use federal regulation to promote shale gas development? Not 
necessarily, for two reasons. First, there are institutional measures in place 
regulating harmful emissions. For example, the CAA already provides an 
adequate vehicle for addressing coal-fired power plant emissions. Existing 
 
354 Id. By way of comparison, electricity prices for continental American households range 
between 8 and 17 cents/kwh. Table 5A. Residential Average Monthly Bill by Census Divison, and State 
2011, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_ 
price/pdf/table5_a.pdf. 
355 Muller et al., supra note 350, at 1672. 
356 A 2009 National Academy of Sciences study estimated the annual non–climate related 
external damages from 406 coal-fired power plants to be $62 billion, or about 3.2 cents/kwh. Press 
Release, National Academy of Sciences, Report Examines Hidden Health and Environmental 
Costs of Energy Production and Consumption in U.S. (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www. 
usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/NAS%20study%20on%20costs%20of%20energy.pdf. Studies of 
the effects of coal on the budgets of Kentucky and West Virginia concluded that coal had a net 
negative impact on both states. See MELISSA FRY KONTY & JASON BAILEY, MTN. ASS’N FOR 
CMTY. ECON. DEV., THE IMPACT OF COAL ON THE KENTUCKY STATE BUDGET (2009), 
available at http://www.maced.org/coal/documents/Impact_of_Coal-Exec_Summary.pdf (calculating 
that the coal industry had about a $115 million net negative impact on Kentucky’s budget); 
Researchers Push for Higher Taxes, Fees, Fines on Coal, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 13, 2010, 
http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201009130914 (reporting that the coal industry cost the West 
Virginia government a net of almost $98 million in the 2009 budget year). 
357 See National Academy of Sciences, supra note 356 (“Burning natural gas generated far less 
damage than coal, both overall and per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated.”). 
358 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). 
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EPA rules regulate emissions of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and 
ozone precursors from coal-fired power plants,359 and the Obama Admin-
istration is moving forward with new rules aimed at reducing emissions of 
mercury,360 carbon dioxide,361 and nitrogen oxides362 from coal-fired power 
plants. While regulatory action to address emissions from coal-fired power 
plants has been contentious and halting,363 these new rules are apparently 
stringent enough to have attracted the intense opposition of industry.364 
Second, the market seems to be providing sufficient incentives for shale gas 
development on its own, without federal help, at least for the time being. The 
excess supply of shale gas has, in fact, caused prices to fall to unprecedented 
lows.365 Nor does it seem likely that a cascade of state and local bans on shale 
gas production will constrain supply any time soon. To the contrary, each 
state is addressing local conflicts over shale gas production on its own terms. 
Under current conditions, then, comprehensive federal licensing legislation 
for shale gas production seems unnecessary, at least for the time being. 
Finally, it should be noted that there are two existing regulatory regimes 
that proponents of comprehensive federal regulation of shale gas production 
might point to as precedents. More specifically, these are regulatory 
 
359 Emissions of conventional pollutants like sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and nitrogen 
oxides from new or modified coal-fired power plants have long been regulated under the CAA. In 
addition, the acid rain program regulates the emission of acid rain precursors (like sulfur dioxide) 
from older coal-fired power plants. For a history of these regulatory programs and an early history of 
the efforts to regulate mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants, see David B. Spence, Coal-
Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 193-99 (2005). 
360 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63) (regulating mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants as toxic 
emissions under section 112 of the CAA for the first time). One byproduct of the new mercury 
rule will be reductions in particulate matter emissions. Id. at 9424. The most serious health costs 
associated with coal-fired power plants are associated with particulate matter emissions. See 
Epstein et al., supra note 38, at 85 (listing various serious—and even fatal—ailments that can occur 
as a result of exposure to particulate matter emissions). 
361 See, e.g., Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (recommending 
new standards for carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel–fired power plants, given the harm to 
public health resulting from climate change); see also supra notes 257-64 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the EPA’s “tailoring rule” for greenhouse gases. 
362 See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011). 
363 See Spence, supra note 359, at 203-11 (describing the differences between the Clinton and 
George W. Bush Administrations’ approaches to EPA regulation). 
364 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, New Air Quality Rules for Power Plants in Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2011, at A24 (detailing opposition from utility companies and Republican Congressmen to 
some of the EPA’s new air pollution regulations for power plants). 
365 See supra note 337. 
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regimes that were based upon stated national interests in regulating despite 
the local nature of the externalities involved. One such regime is the 
SDWA, which is difficult to justify on national emergency or interstate 
pollution externalities grounds.366 The protection of groundwater—even for 
drinking purposes—seems primarily a local concern, yet Congress made its 
protection a matter of federal responsibility. Why? As a risk-regulation 
regime covering multiple industries, the SDWA (including its underground-
injection-well program) can be justified on race to the bottom grounds in 
ways that federal regulation of fracking cannot. That is, in the absence of 
federal regulation protecting drinking water wells, one can at least imagine a 
narrowly self-interested waste disposer forum-shopping for a state in which 
disposal is unregulated.367 As a matter of historical reality, it seems that the 
SDWA was Congress’s response to a perceived instance of state regulatory 
failure. The statute authorizes light-handed regulation, designed to push 
states to ensure that drinking water is safe. Congress made a policy judg-
ment that the SDWA was necessary to protect public health, and that it had 
the constitutional power to regulate it.368 There is an ongoing process of 
documenting and measuring the environmental, health, and safety impacts 
of fracking, as well as its benefits, including environmental ones, and its 
costs. We do not yet have a clear picture of either side of the balance, and 
the SDWA’s regulation of similarly localized activities does not seem reason 
enough to federalize the regulation of shale gas production.  
A second useful precedent for proponents of federalizing the regulation 
of shale gas production is the SMCRA.369 This act created a federal licensing 
regime for coal mining, one Congress deemed necessary because of the 
importance of the coal industry to the national economy and because state 
environmental regulation had failed.370 The regulatory program established 
by the SMCRA set up federal standards that states can administer by 
federally approved programs, thus providing minimum federal standards to 
 
366 See Revesz, supra note 160, at 540 (“[E]nvironmental problems such as the control of 
drinking water quality [create] virtually no interstate pollution externalities.”).  
367 Even here, however, the race-to-the-bottom argument seems unpersuasive. Anyone who 
recklessly or knowingly contaminates a drinking water source faces liability risks irrespective of 
the SDWA. See, e.g., supra note 64 (discussing liability of Cabot Energy for contamination of 
drinking water sources in Dimock, Pennsylvania). Rather, the SDWA seems aimed more at 
pushing states to regulate drinking water sources than at preventing a race to the bottom.  
368 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) (2006). 
369 See note 196 and accompanying text. 
370 See id.; see also Olivier A. Taillieu, Case Note, Agency Action: OSM’s Regulations under 
Strict Scrutiny from the D.C. Circuit, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 935, 961 (1998) (noting that, prior to 
the enactment of SMCRA, mining was plagued by undercapitalized firms that caused environ-
mental harm).  
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which states must adhere.371 Most of the impacts of surface mining are felt 
locally in the form of denuded land and changes in the character of the area, 
just as in the fracking context.372 The coal industry was certainly a nationally 
important industry (even a strategic one) at the time of the SMCRA’s 
enactment, but one could argue that the natural gas industry is becoming 
equally important within the American energy policy environment. On the 
other hand, the impacts of surface mining were well understood at the time 
of the SMCRA’s passage, 373 and they dwarf those associated with fracking. 
Yet the differences and similarities between surface mining and shale-gas 
production are matters of judgment, and the SMCRA remains an example 
of federal regulation of an essentially local (albeit enormous) environmental 
problem, likely not plagued by significant race-to-the-bottom problems. 
However, the fact that Congress has exercised federal regulatory authority 
in past situations that are not explained by the traditional rationales for 
federal regulation does not constitute a strong case for regulating shale-gas 
production today. 
CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR NARROW  
FEDERAL REGULATION ONLY 
It is certainly conceivable that the case for greater regulation of shale-gas 
production may turn out to be strong. Indeed, to many it appears that such 
regulation has lagged behind the industry’s growth, which has triggered 
controversy and public opposition to fracking in some places and a process 
of adaptation by regulators. Controversy over fracking will be resolved 
politically, by actors whose concerns for principles of federalism will 
probably be dwarfed by their desires to promote or restrict fracking for 
policy reasons. Opponents and proponents of shale-gas production mobilize 
their supporters and advance their arguments for and against regulation at 
all levels of government. Local ordinances, state laws, and federal laws 
 
371 30 U.S.C. § 1211. 
372 As with natural gas production, coal mining has some interstate impacts, but most of 
those can be addressed through existing federal authorities, such as the CWA. See e.g., Proposed 
Suspension and Modification of Nationwide Permit 21, 74 Fed. Reg. 3411 (July 15, 2009) (revising 
the permitting program for disposal of fill materials from mining activities under CWA Section 
404); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005) (overturning and 
remanding district court decision finding nationwide permitting inconsistent with the CWA); 
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding fill 
activities under a nationwide permit); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860 
(S.D. W. Va. 2009) (holding that the issuance of a nationwide permit was arbitrary and capricious).  
373 For a brief summary of the impacts to land and water from surface mining, see Taillieu, 
supra note 370, at 961 (noting that, before SMCRA’s enactment, “people grossly abuse[d] the land” 
when mining coal). 
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addressing fracking (by permitting, prohibiting, or regulating it) are the 
products of this political conflict: opponents of fracking may prevail in one 
setting, proponents of fracking in another. The product of these political 
processes is a seemingly messy regulatory environment, characterized by 
fragmentation and fluidity.  
A single federal regulatory regime for shale-gas production would cer-
tainly be a much neater solution, at least conceptually. A federal licensing 
regime could both preempt unnecessarily restrictive local laws and establish 
uniform minimum standards applicable across the country. Such an ap-
proach would relieve producers from having to worry about multiple state 
regulatory regimes, and a system of well-drawn rules might provide a 
minimum level of environmental protection in the event states or localities 
fail to regulate adequately.  
But however conceptually easy that solution sounds, it is problematic for 
at least two reasons. First, it assumes that federal government actors 
(Congress or the EPA) can better regulate and balance the costs and 
benefits of fracking than can state and local government officials whose 
constituents are directly experiencing most of those costs and benefits. 
Whatever the potential imperfections of the local policymaking process, 
such as susceptibility to capture or a race to the bottom, the most important 
impacts of shale-gas production—changes in local character of the commu-
nity, potential contamination of groundwater, and water supply issues—are 
matters of local concern.  
Moreover, despite regulatory lags in some places, state and local gov-
ernments appear to be adjusting to new information about the local risks 
associated with fracking and shale gas production. Local governments are 
amending their ordinances and states are updating their regulatory regimes 
to respond to newly—or better—understood risks. For instance, both Texas 
and Pennsylvania have recently strengthened their regulations governing 
fracking, and New York will soon establish a new regulatory regime for 
fracking. These actions are typical of states where fracking occurs. There is 
no evidence to suggest that the states’ varying approaches to these questions 
reflect industry capture; an equally likely explanation is that each state is 
balancing the costs and benefits of development differently. For these 
reasons, the enactment of a comprehensive licensing program or broad 
federal regulation focused on shale-gas production seems, at the very least, 
premature at this time. 
For now, the better option is for the federal government to restrict its 
regulation of fracking to those aspects of the industry that produce inter-
state effects or implicate established national interests. For example, fracking 
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can entail air pollution that poses a threat to established national air pollu-
tion standards and greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals, and the EPA 
is well equipped to address those risks under the CAA. In particular, the 
EPA is studying the problem of fugitive methane emissions from natural 
gas production operations—a problem afflicting all natural gas production, 
not simply fracturing operations. Nevertheless, the explosive growth in 
natural gas production means that fugitive emissions have grown accordingly. 
Given the agency’s interest in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we can 
expect the EPA to propose additional limits on fugitive emissions in the 
future, perhaps as a byproduct of its study on the risks of fracking. Like-
wise, the EPA can use the CWA and SDWA’s regulatory regimes to 
address risks associated with the disposal of fracking wastewater into surface 
waters, sewage treatment facilities, and underground injection wells. The 
EPA has the power to propose new effluent standards governing the 
issuance of NPDES permits for the disposal of wastewater from fracking 
operations and pretreatment standards for the disposal of that wastewater to 
municipal sewage treatment plants. Both problems are within the domain of 
its ongoing study of fracking, and we might anticipate new rules addressing 
those risks as well. 
Continuing regulatory adjustment by states (and by the EPA using ex-
isting federal authority), then, is an appropriate response to rapid change, 
and is to be expected. The use of fracking to produce natural gas from shale 
formations is, despite its explosive growth, still a relatively young industry. 
Its growth has caught regulators by surprise, and they are responding in 
myriad ways. We are still learning about the impacts of this form of natural 
gas production, and as we learn, we can adapt. Based upon the application 
of the principles of federalism to this regulatory issue, federal regulators 
ought to let that process of learning and adaptation play out mostly in the 
states, intervening only to address risks of national concern.  
